secret 4.sec.33 2:3 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

And when she was no longer able to keep him secret, she made him a basket out of the stems of water-plants, pasting sticky earth over it to keep the water out; and placing the baby in it she put it among the plants by the edge of the Nile.

well-developed r.r.992 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Strategic Goal
Protect the United States from terrorist attack.
Situation
Terrorism is the most significant national
security threat our country faces.  The FBI
counterterrorism goal is specific and compelling
— it must prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist
operations before attacks occur.  Effectively
combating this threat presents unique and
unprecedented challenges.  The terrorists’ target
is clear:  the United States and its interests both
here and abroad.  However, terrorist planning,
methods, sponsorship, and operational timing
are typically obscured by meticulous and
compartmentalized planning, the effective use
of permeable international borders and often
friendly state-sponsors, and the ability to adapt
and evolve as efforts against them become
effective.  Terrorists’ ability to obtain and
use WMD materiel and technology for mass
casualty attacks must be curtailed.
In the international terrorism arena, FBI
investigations have revealed an extensive
militant Islamic presence in the United States.
The activities of these militants are focused
principally on fund-raising, recruitment, and
training, but they have a sufficiently well-
structured and well-developed support system
that could be activated to carry out operations
within the United States and abroad.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The FBI’s greatest concern currently is the
threat from al-Qaeda attack cells, which retain
the ability to inflict serious harm with little
or no warning.  These cells maintain strict
operational and communications security
and minimize contact with militant Islamic
Data Definitions:  Terrorist Acts
Committed by Foreign Nationals counts
separate incidents that involve the
“unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate
or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof,
in furtherance of political or social
objectives.” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).  For
the purposes of this measure, the FBI
defines a terrorist act as an attack against
a single target (e.g. a building or physical
structure, an aircraft, etc.)  Acts against
single targets are counted as separate
acts, even if they are coordinated to
have simultaneous impact.  For example,
each of the 9/11 acts (North Tower of
the World Trade Center (WTC), South
Tower of the WTC, the Pentagon, and
the Pennsylvania crash site could have
occurred independently of each other
and still have been a significant terrorist
act in and of itself.  The FBI uses the term
terrorist incident to describe the overall
concerted terrorist attack.  A terrorist
incident may consist of multiple terrorist
acts.  The 9/11 attacks, therefore, are
counted as four terrorist acts and one
terrorist incident.
Terrorist Acts Committed by
Foreign Nationals Against
United States Interests
within U. S. Borders
0
2
4
6
Fiscal Years
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0 0
4
0 0 0
Terrorist acts by foreign nationals

toolmarks 3.too.0002001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Mission
The Firearms-Toolmarks Unit (FTU) applies valid scientific practices in the forensic examination of firearms, ammunition components, toolmarks, gunshot residue on victim clothing, bullet trajectories, and closely-related physical evidence. The Team
Physical science technicians, physical scientist, physical scientists (forensic examiner), special agents, ammunition specialist, and management and program assistant

The Work

Physical Evidence
Examine evidence related to firearms, firearm components, ammunition, ammunition components, tools, and toolmarks.

Gun Shot Residue

• Examine lead and other metal fragments, shot wads, shot cups, and bullets removed from bodies at autopsy;
• Examine and microscopically compares bullets and ammunition components to each other, as well as any other firearms to determine whether an association exists; and
• Examine evidence in toolmark cases including screwdrivers, knives, crowbars, saws, chains, human bone or cartilage, locks, bolts, and screens.

Toolmarks

• Examine and identify a toolmark as having been produced by a particular tool to the exclusion of all others;
• Perform shot pattern examinations, gunshot reside examinations, trajectory analysis examinations, and serial number restorations exists;
• Provide support in investigative and administrative matters, including the collection, preservation, and processing of evidence and crime scene reconstruction, both nationally and internationally;
• Serve as liaison with national and international forensic laboratories;
• Provide extensive training to members of law enforcement agencies, crime scene personnel, and investigators; and

encircle the overextended Roman army 5.up.00004 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

n the spring of 216 BC, Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. He thus placed himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. As Polybius notes, the capture of Cannae “caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district”.^[3] The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of the Carthaginian general. After two days’ march, they found him on the left bank of the Aufidus River and encamped six miles (10 km) away.

Reportedly, a Carthaginian officer named Gisgo commented on how much larger the Roman army was. Hannibal replied, “another thing that has escaped your notice, Gisgo, is even more amazing—that although there are so many of them, there is not one among them called Gisgo.”

Consul Varro, who was in command on the first day, is presented by ancient sources as a man of reckless nature and hubris, and was determined to defeat Hannibal. While the Romans were approaching Cannae, a small portion of Hannibal’s forces ambushed the Roman army. Varro successfully repelled the Carthaginian attack and continued on his way to Cannae. This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered the confidence of the Roman army, perhaps to overconfidence on Varro’s part. Paullus, however, was opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he was prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open ground, despite the Romans’ numerical strength. This was especially true since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry (both in quality and numerical terms). Despite these misgivings, Paullus thought it unwise to withdraw the army Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire after the initial success, and camped two-thirds of the army east of the Aufidus River, sending the remainder of his men to fortify a position on the opposite side. The purpose of this second camp was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass those of the enemy.

The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second of these two days (August 1), Hannibal, well aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle. Paullus, however, refused. When his request was rejected, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of the Aufidus’ water to the Roman troops, sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass water-bearing soldiers that were found outside the camp fortifications. According to Polybius,^[3] Hannibal’s cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the supply of water to the Roman camp.^[15]

[edit] Battle

[edit] Forces

Figures for troops involved in battles are often unreliable and Cannae is no exception. Hence the following figures should be treated with caution, especially those for the Carthaginian side.^[16] The combined forces of the two consuls totaled 75,000 infantry, 2,400 Roman cavalry and 4,000 allied horse (involved in the actual battle) and, in the two fortified camps, 2,600 heavily armed men, 7,400 lightly armed men (a total of 10,000), so that the total strength the Romans brought to the field amounted to approximately 86,400 men. Opposing them was a Carthaginian army composed of roughly 27,000 heavy infantry, 6,000 light infantry, and 8,000 cavalry in the battle itself, irrespective of detachments.^[17] The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions. Along with the core of 8,000 Libyans fought 8,000 Iberians, 16,000 Gauls (8,000 were left at camp the day of battle) and around 5,500 Gaetulian Infantry. Hannibal’s cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Spanish, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Liby-Phoenician cavalry. Finally, Hannibal had around 8,000 skirmishers consisting of Balearian slingers and mixed nationality spearmen. All of these specific groups brought their respective strengths to the battle. The uniting factor for the Carthaginian army was the personal tie each group had with Hannibal.^[18]

[edit] Equipment

Rome’s forces used traditional Roman equipment including pila and hastae as weapons as well as traditional helmets, shields, and body armor. On the other hand, the Carthaginian army used a variety of equipment. Spaniards fought with swords suited for cutting and thrusting, javelins, and incendiary spears. For defense Spanish warriors carried large oval shields. The Gauls on the other hand carried long slashing swords and small but sturdy oval shields. The heavy Carthaginian cavalry carried two javelins and a curved slashing sword with a heavy shield for protection. Numidians, being light cavalry, used no armor but carried a small shield, javelins, and a sword. Skirmishers acting as light infantry carried either slings or spears. The Balearian slingers, who were famous for their accuracy, carried short, medium, and long slings used to throw stones—they may have had a small shield strapped to their arms but this is uncertain.^[19]

The equipment of the Libyan line infantry has been much debated. Ducan Head has argued in favor of short stabbing spears.^[20] Polybius states that the Libyans fought with equipment taken from previously defeated Romans but it is unclear whether he meant simply shields and armor or offensive weapons as well^[21] Dally is inclined to the view that Libyan infantry would have copied the Spanish use of the sword during their fighting there and so were armed pretty much the same way as the Romans.^[22] Connolly has argued that they were armed as a pike armed phalanx.^[23] This has been rejected by Head because Plutarch states they carried spears shorter than the Roman Triarii.^[20] and by Dally because they could not have carried an unwieldy pike at the same time as a heavy Roman style shield^[21]

[edit] Tactical deployment

The conventional deployment for armies of the time was to place infantry in the center and deploy the cavalry in two flanking “wings”. The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for their infantry line, hoping to use this concentration of forces to quickly break through the center of Hannibal’s line. Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to penetrate Hannibal’s center during the Battle of the Trebia, and he planned to recreate this on an even greater scale. The principes were stationed immediately behind the hastati, ready to push forward at first contact to ensure the Romans presented a unified front. As Polybius wrote, “the maniples were nearer each other, or the intervals were decreased… and the maniples showed more depth than front”.^[3][24] Even though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal size to their numerically inferior opponents.

Initial deployment and Roman attack (in red).

To Varro, Hannibal seemed to have little room to manoeuver and no means of retreat as he was deployed with the Aufidus River to his rear. Varro believed that when pressed hard by the Romans’ superior numbers, the Carthaginians would fall back onto the river and, with no room to manoeuver, would be cut down in panic. Bearing in mind that Hannibal’s two previous victories had been largely decided by his trickery and ruse, Varro had sought an open battlefield. The field at Cannae was indeed clear, with no possibility of hidden troops being brought to bear as an ambush.^[25]

Hannibal, on the other hand, had deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses in devising his strategy.^[26] He placed his Iberians, Gauls and Celtiberians in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition across the front line. Hannibal’s infantry from Punic Africa was positioned on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. These infantry were expertly battle-hardened, remained cohesive, and would attack the Roman flanks.

Hasdrubal led the Iberian and Celtiberian cavalry on the left (south near the Aufidus River) of the Carthaginian army. Hasdrubal was given about 6,500 cavalry, and Hanno had 3,500 Numidians on the right.

Hannibal intended that his cavalry, comprising mainly medium Hispanic cavalry and Numidian light horse, and positioned on the flanks, defeat the weaker Roman cavalry and swing around to attack the Roman infantry from the rear as it pressed upon Hannibal’s weakened center. His veteran African troops would then press in from the flanks at the crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Roman army.

Hannibal was unworried about his position against the Aufidus River; in fact, it played a major factor in his strategy. By anchoring his army on the river, Hannibal prevented one of his flanks from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. The Romans were in front of the hill leading to Cannae and hemmed in on their right flank by the Aufidus River, so that their left flank was the only viable means of retreat.^[27] In addition, the Carthaginian forces had manoeuvred so that the Romans would face east. Not only would the morning sunlight shine on the Romans, but the southeasterly winds would blow sand and dust into their faces as they approached the battlefield.^[24] Hannibal’s unique deployment of his army, based on his perception of the terrain and understanding of the capabilities of his troops, proved decisive.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire