No. 69
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
FROM: Tokyo November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 757.
(Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)
Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my # 726 [a] and said, “As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the Government and represents he maximum compromise that we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.
“1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in agreement on this score.
“2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America’s desires concerning non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.
“3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included in this document are many matters in which Great Britain’s interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make preparations to sign.” I added, “I hope that the Government of the United States will undertake this.”
The American Ambassador answered, “I have had no instructions from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true situation in detail, so the American Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner.”
[a] See IV, 25-28.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 70
FROM: Tokyo November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 757.
(Part 3 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)
I answered, “Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The
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feeling in favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a result of America’s actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat, indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of carrying this out.
“On this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a course is impossible.”
At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: “We cannot accept the results of aggression.” I refuted him by saying, “The Imperial Government does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore, make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these.”
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 71
FROM: Tokyo November 11, 1941
TO: Washington #758.
Re my # 757 [a].
In these talks, the conferences being conducted in Washington are referred to as being “negotiations”. The U. S. Ambassador here states that they should be termed “conversations”. I, therefore, replied that I thought they were well within the realm of “negotiations” now. The Ambassador seems to have been satisfied with this.
[a] See IV, 68.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 72
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1066.
(Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 2.)
1. I sent —— [a] to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
“The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action.”
2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:
“You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone.” Then he continued: “The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation.”Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.
He replied, however:
“Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State.”
[a] Name withheld.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 73
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1066.
(Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 2.)
In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke to told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.
3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 74
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1059.
The conference with the President has been scheduled for Monday at 11 a.m.
Trans. 11-12-41
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No. 75
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1069.
(Extremely Urgent.)
Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour’s conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL. I told them what you said in your instructions and explained in detail our proposal for the settlement of the three problems. In response the President said that in the present world crisis the American Government has as its objective to contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific in the spirit of fair play and that he hoped the Japanese-American conversations would be effective.
He continued, “In accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government we will endeavor immediately to continue the parleys and I hope that Japan too will make it evident that she intends to take a friendly attitude. What the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace.”
He concluded with the promise that he would carefully study, with Secretary HULL, our proposals as explained by me and after thinking them over make a reply.
I will wire you the details later, however, I am in a hurry to send you this resume.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 76
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 4.)
(To be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the department.)
My interview with the President, referred to in my # 1069 [a], was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. It was as follows:
Prefacing my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instructions, I said, “I have had no talks with the Secretary of State for about three weeks: ever since the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; and since the present situation between Japan and the United States is such that it could not be left as it is, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations on this question have lasted for more than six months. From their inception, Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people of Japan also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; however, the conversations have dragged on and in the meantime the relation between the two countries has grown worse. It has become increasingly difficult for the people of my country to be patient. Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime made many concessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compromises. As a result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if the United States is really sincere in this matter. The Japanese people regard the freezing of funds as a kind of economic blockade, and there seem to be some who say that modern warfare is not limited to shooting alone. No country can exist without the supply of materials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have received from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening and, therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United States to come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and satisfactory agreement. It is for no other purpose than
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
that of keeping peace in the Pacific that the Japanese Government is endeavoring so hard to arrive at a satisfactory agreement by continuing our conversations.
[a] See IV, 75.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 77
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Very Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 4.)
“As a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has made the recent proposal. I wish that your Government would make its views clear to us as soon as possible by responding to the views and desires expressed by the Japanese Government.” Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
I incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU to assist me. Then I continued and said, by way of an explanation of our proposal, that taking together the views expressed on October 2 by the Secretary of State relative to our proposal of September 25, and what both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary had said subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled down to consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say:
1. “As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to recognize the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, to be applied to the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire Pacific area including China. Since this is something which the Secretary of State has often spoken to me about as being a long-cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee which our Government is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you.
2. “Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war, we proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the action on the part of the two governments should be based upon consideration of ‘protection and self-defense.'” (The English text used our expression as it stood.)
Regarding this point, I asked whether the United States Government would guarantee that it will not give an unnecessarily broad interpretation to the words “protection” and “self-defense”, and I said, “If the Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the United States Government, the Japanese Government is also willing to give a similar guarantee.” I continued, “As to the words ‘in case the United States enters the war, etc.,’ since our conversations had for their object the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a position, under the present circumstances, to make any definite statement outside of what has been given in our proposal of September 25. Unless we have confidence in each other, as you well realize, no guarantee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by a hundred promises and a hundred documents.”
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 78
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Very Urgent.)
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(Part 3 of 4.)
3. I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question of stationing and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, “With regard to this question, the Japanese Government has gone a step beyond her past proposals and has, by definitely fixing not only the localities in China where our troops would be stationed but also the period of their occupation, made it clear that the occupation is not a permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to see the troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish that you would give favorable consideration to this question from the standpoint of the general situation.
Next, I said, “The Japanese Government is making the following proposal with regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China,” and so saying, I submitted the proposal contained in your instructions.http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
In reply to this, the President, remarking that he had already thought on the question before our explanation was given him, spoke as follows from a note which he had been holding in his hand, “As a result of a confusion created by the forces of aggression, the whole world has fallen into a critical state. What seems to me to be common sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world will return to peaceful normalcy and for the United States Government to do its utmost in the spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability, and order in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must be effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the preliminary talks relative to this question would have good results which would serve as a basis of future negotiations. I will, just as the Japanese Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on these negotiations successfully. I wish that the Japanese Government would clearly set forth its intention of following a peaceful course in its policy and not an opposite course. This is the way to attain the results toward which both you and we are working.”
What the United States desires, according to the President, are (1) to prevent the war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent peace.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 79
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Very Urgent.)
(Part 4 of 4.)
The President elaborated on the point that with regard to the question of non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILL when he had conferred with that statesman to abolish the economic limitations throughout the world; that he had opposed Germany because Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea; and that he wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of an incidental remark that in the days of President TAFT when disturbance arose in Cuba, the United States had failed by resorting to a policy of force; however, today under his administration, because the government had adopted a friendly policy, the relations with the Latin-American countries had improved. He then explained how necessary it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations. Secretary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries, who had in the past been fearful of the United States, have come to take an attitude of welcoming the United States. Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, “It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the people are to live,” and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as “method of living.” Although it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.
The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his custom, a children’s party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 80
FROM: Tokyo 11 November 1941
TO: Washington # 762.
Re your # 1069 [a].
Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message # 736 [b] is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time.
The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.
I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.
We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A.
[a] See IV, 75.
[b] See IV, 44.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 81
FROM: Tokyo 11 November 1941
TO: Washington # 763.
Re my 671 [a].
With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambas-
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sador in Tokyo that in view of the present general-relationship between the United States and Japan, it was essential that this matter be given very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation would bear any fruit.
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