Army China Secret wire 8.arm.222990 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

FROM: Tokyo June 6 1941 TO: Rome (Rikugun) #109. Part 1[a]. Army China Secret wire. Answer to your wire #270[b]. 1. It will be possible to furnish the raw materials other than nickel. However, it will be possible to furnish an alloy, nickel-RUTSUPE, which is a (?copper?) alloy containing 2% of nickel. If raw materials are furnished, study must be given to the problem of transportation. 2. In obtaining technical aid for manufacturing processes, we would like to obtain two or three men for a period of about one half a year. [a] Part 5 same number. No other parts available. [b] Not available. Trans. 3-29-45 FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY, Vice Minister of War) June 6, 1941 TO: Rome #109. Part 5[a]. Army “China” secret wire. 3. (?We would like?) a considerable quantity of ammunition as a sample. We would not only like to purchase the powder, but would like also to obtain the manufacturing rights. In the problem of supply of —1/2G— and raw materials, the difficult problem concerns the 21 RYU manufacturing (?plans?). The main aim is the purchase of manufacturing plans, and we would like to have you carry on the negotiations assigning the purchase of cannon (KAHO) ammunition to second place. [a] Part 1 same number. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  No other parts available. Trans. 3-30-45 [39] FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) June 17, 1941 TO: Tokyo (Autumn) (Head, General Affairs Department) #410. Today, the 17th, Col. HAYASHI interviewed the code chief of the ABWEHR and discussed with him questions of future operations.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   There Germans are anxious to work closely with Japan in view of the present situation and both men agreed that they should begin with the solving of Russian codes. We would like to know when interpreters SEKIMOTO and TAKAHASHI will be able to leave. DoD Comment: See Vol. III, Part C, Section 465 for related information. Trans. 6-25-45 FROM: Berlin (Japanese Ambassador) June 21, 1941 TO: Tokyo (Foreign Office) #739. Regarding my 1728[a]. In case it is clear that as a result of the talks between Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Ambassador Abetz, there are no prospects of any success, am I to understand that in accordance with your circular 2134 (?), I am to refuse their assistance? Please reply to this. On the 20th, I had a conversation with RI[b], at which time I told him that in case there did not seem to be any prospects of the actions of German assistance, Japan was considering taking suitable steps. “RI” asked, “What kind of steps,” I replied that there were no instructions as yet. However, conditions will arise under which Japan, in achieving her individual ends, might find it convenient to make use of Germany, and I believe that it would be expedient for Japan to outline very clearly the steps she plans to take under such circumstances. [a] Not available. [b] Ribbentrop. Trans. 6-25-41 FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) June 1941 TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN, Vice Minister of War) #478. (?Part 1?)[a] Committee wire #38. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  Following are the results up to the present of an investigation concerning PO[b] company cartridge cases. 1. There is a possibility of introducing the manufacturing process for these cartridge cases into Japan (there is no patent on it). 2. We will obtain technical experts. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   We are limited to 3 types, a —1G— of a caliber of 7.7 mm., a 47 mm. anti-tank gun, and a 75 mm. in the above calibers in our estimated requirements please let us know immediately. 3. After reaching an agreement, it will be possible to get practical instruction in the PO[b] matter of sending technical experts to Japan from Germany who will supervise manufacture. [a] See Part 2, next message. [b] Probably POLTE. Trans. 3-30-45 [40]  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

toyoda 2.toy.001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[xvi]  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire.

OUTLINE OF VOLUME III

Part A

Hull-Nomura Conversations (August 5, 1941 – October 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull’s Reports  http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de
(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Reports

Part B

Japanese Naval Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages

(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

Part C

Japanese Diplomatic Activities Throughout the World

(a) Japanese-American Relations
(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations
(c) Japanese-Philippine Relations
(d) Japanese-Mexican Relations
(e) Japanese-South American Relations
(f) Japanese-British Relations
(g) Japanese-German Relations
(h) Japanese-Russian Relations
(i) Japanese-Italian Relations
(j) Japanese-French Relations
(k) Japanese-Chungking Relations
(1) Japanese-Nanking Relations
(m) Japanese-Dutch Relations
(n) Japanese-Thaiese Relations

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

CHAPTER III

Renewed Insistence by the Japanese Government upon Its Peaceful Purposes—Resumption of Conversations[1]

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (August 5, 1941 – October 17, 1941)

1. Tokyo Sends New Proposal to Ambassador Nomura (August 5, 1941)

Despite Japan’s efforts to solve the difficulties in Japanese-American relations, domestic issues were frequently an obstacle. Furthermore, on August 5, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that though he had reported that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, despite the opposition of American public opinion, were displaying considerable understanding in their attitude toward Japan, many Japanese were complaining against the intensified economic pressure being exerted by the United States.[2]

A newspaper report that President Roosevelt either had ordered the complete suspension of petroleum exports, or was about to curtail them, had created a great deal of antagonism in Japan. Warning that the continuance of such economic pressure or the maintenance of an encirclement policy would jeopardize Japanese-American relations, the Japanese Foreign Minister declared that both countries had reached the most important and most critical moment in their relations. To avert the impression that current negotiations had been begun under the threat of economic pressure, he suggested that all measures that might be construed as such should be abandoned at once.

Stating that Japan now proposed a new plan which was based on the one outlined by the last Cabinet, and which had been drawn up as a reply to the proposal of President Roosevelt on July 24, 1941 with the intention of incorporating its provisions into the final agreement, the Japanese Foreign Minister commented:

With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-United States negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime.[3]

Ambassador Nomura was also instructed to explain verbally that Japan’s action in peacefully occupying French Indo-China was a joint defense measure to make intervention by a third country unnecessary.[4] According to this explanation, Japanese public opinion had become aroused by the attitude of England, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, and for this reason French Indo-China had to be occupied to restrain those in Japan who were clamoring for vigorous overseas action.

In his instructions to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda admitted that this explanation might not completely eliminate the sense of uneasiness felt by the United States, but he believed that at least it would be accepted conditionally. Acting on this assumption, Japan had decided that discussions on the new proposal should be conducted unofficially and in secret.

[1] Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents—Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941 in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, Volume II, 343. Hereafter referred to as S.D., II.
[2] Appendix III, No. 1. Hereafter Appendix III will be referred to as III, 1.
[3] Ibid.
[4] III, 2.

[1]

Stressing the anxiety of both countries to determine the fundamental causes which had led to the present critical condition, and emphasizing the belief that America was as desirous as Japan to remove or otherwise relieve, at its source, any and all military, economic, and political uneasiness existing between the two nations, Japan made the following proposals:

(1) The government of Japan definitely promises the following:

(a) So as to remove all military threats to the territories held by the United States, Japan will not occupy any territory in the Southwestern Pacific area, other than French Indo-China. Moreover, the Japanese military forces in French Indo-China will be removed immediately upon the conclusion of the China Incident.

(b) For the purpose of removing all military and political threats to the Philippine Islands, we shall, at an opportune moment, guarantee the neutrality of those Islands. In return we ask that the Imperial Government and its people be treated in the same manner as those of all other countries, including the United States.

(c) In order to remove the cause of the unsettled economic condition between the two countries in East Asia, we will cooperate in the production of and access to the natural resources of this area which are essential to the United States.

(2) The United States definitely promises the following:

(a) For the purpose of removing military threats to the Japanese Empire and to the importing and exporting of goods to and from Japan, the United States will cease military operations in the Southwestern Pacific area. Moreover, upon the effectuating of this agreement, the United States will use its good offices to have the governments of Britain and the Netherlands East Indies to take similar steps.

(b) For the purpose of removing the causes of military, political, and economic conflict between the two countries in—–, the United States will cooperate with Japan in the production of and access to natural resources of the Southwest Pacific area particularly of the Netherlands East Indies, which are essential to Japan. Moreover, the United States will cooperate with Japan in trying to have all the latter’s differences with the Netherlands East Indies settled.

(c) In connection with the above, suitable measures shall be adopted immediately by the two nations to bring about the resumption of the profitable trade relations which used to exist between Japan and the United States.

(d) In view of the promise made by the Government of Japan under (1), (a), of the above, and with a view toward bringing about a settlement of the China Affair, the Government of the United States shall use its good offices to bring about a peace conference between Japan and the Chiang regime. Also, even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indo-China, Japan’s special position there will be given recognition. (Last sentence garbled, gist guessed at.)

(3) Public Announcement. (—–will be stressed verbally) as was stated above, negotiations of this proposal shall be made in secrecy. Should, however, it become evident that it would be to the interest of both nations if part or all of the points contained were made public, it shall be done at the time and in the manner agreed upon by the two participants.5

2. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 6, 1941)

(a) State Department Report[6]

On August 6, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary of State to submit his government’s reply to President Roosevelt’s proposal of July 24, 1941. Explaining that the delay in answering had taken place in Tokyo, and that he had not received instructions until the preceding evening, Ambassador Nomura read an oral statement and then handed a copy of it to Mr. Ballantine.

The document stated that in order to mollify Japanese public opinion by counteracting the successive measures taken by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies against Japan, and to preserve peace in the Pacific, the Japanese government had effected a joint occupation of French Indo-China for the purpose of self-defense.7 To dispel the anxiety which America had manifested over this situation, the Japanese government had in-

[5] III, 2. For English text of this proposal as submitted by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull, see S.D., II, 549. The English text was also sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura, III, 3-5.
[6] “Memorandum of a conversation”, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, August 6, 1941, S.D., II, 546-548.
[7] “Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on August 6, 1941”, S.D., II, 548-549. See III, No. 1 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.

[2]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

structed Ambassador Nomura to enter into negotiations on an “off the record” basis, and to submit a proposal which was intended as a reply to the suggestion made by President Roosevelt on July 24, 1941. This would serve as a fresh basis for a Japanese-American understanding. Any agreements resulting from the negotiations would be then incorporated into the general formula for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

Japan believed that both countries realized it was more than ever necessary to examine calmly with mutual understanding the diverse viewpoints of the two nations. In order to remove the causes responsible for military, political, and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Japanese government would agree not to station troops in the Southwest Pacific, except in French Indo-China, and to withdraw its army even from that area when the China Incident had reached a settlement.

In turn, America was to suspend its military measures in the Southwest Pacific area and was to advise Great Britain and the Netherlands to take similar steps. Japan also guaranteed the neutrality of the Philippine Islands, provided that discriminatory measures would not be taken against Japanese subjects by either the United States or any other nation. By close cooperation between Japan and the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as might be required by either country, normal trade relations were to be restored.[8]

Although Ambassador Nomura wished to discuss the contents of the Japanese proposal immediately, Secretary Hull pocketed the copy given him, and suggested that any discussion of it be postponed pending his study of the document. Admitting to the Japanese Ambassador that he was pessimistic regarding the value of the proposal which had been mentioned in the Japanese representative’s oral statement, Secretary Hull referred to the arduous but unsuccessful efforts made by both men to improve relations between the United States and Japan.

Pointing to the continuous agitation in the government-controlled Japanese press and to statements of high officials advocating a policy of force and conquest, Secretary Hull drew a parallel between the Japanese contention that theirs was strictly a campaign of precautionary aggression, and German insistence that its action in Europe and its war against Russia was a matter of self-defense. In view of the Japanese belief that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan, Secretary Hull felt that future conversations would be valueless. The meeting was then concluded on a defeatist note.[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[10]

Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 6, 1941 he called on Secretary Hull to carry out the instructions received from Tokyo on August 5, 1941. Having made a detailed explanation of Japan’s intentions, he then submitted Japan’s proposal in English to the Secretary of State.[11] Secretary Hull promised to study the proposal carefully, but, according to Ambassador Nomura, he had not seemed to take much interest in it, and had begun to express his opinions on current Japanese-American relations without further mention of the proposal. Ambassador Nomura summarized the Secretary Hull’s statement as follows:

Setting aside the relations between him and me, he said he was greatly disappointed in the actions Japan has been taking one after another, and that so long as Japan does not give up the policy of force, there was no use talking.

So long as the Japanese Government authorities say that what the United States is doing is encirclement of Japan, he could not expect anything of Japan (“I can expect nothing from you”). When we wish to live in peace and security, HITLER, saying that he was acting in self-defense, mows down everything that stands in his way.[12]

[8] “Proposal by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State,” August 6, 1941, S.D., II 549-550. See II, No. 2 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.
[9] S.D. II, 546-548.
[10] III, 6-7.
[11] II, 3-5,6.
[12] III, 6-7.

[3]

Ambassador Nomura came away from this interview convinced that no matter what explanation was offered, it could not convey Japan’s intentions to the leaders of the United States. Moreover, he felt that the United States was determined to deal with any situation.[13]

3. Tokyo Requests an Immediate Report from Ambassador Nomura

On August 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda complained to Ambassador Nomura that he had not yet received a report concerning the action he had requested the Japanese Ambassador to take on July 23, 1941.[14] Unfortunately, the message indicating the action to be taken was garbled either in transmission or interception, and American cryptanalysts were unable to discover the nature of the request.[15] In view of his previous dilatoriness, Ambassador Nomura was ordered to report immediately the results of his interview with Secretary Hull on August 6, 1941 concerning the New Japanese proposal.[16]

As a result of this reprimand, Ambassador Nomura replied that he had sent several reports relating to discussions between Minister Wakasugi and Messrs. Welles and Hamilton which had indicated that the American authorities saw no course but to end the conversations.[17] Ambassador Nomura also reported that the publisher of the Army-Navy Journal, had called upon him to state that the American people, including even the middle west isolationists, supported the administration’s policies toward Japan. According to Ambassador Nomura, he was deeply concerned that only a few Americans of influence were sympathetic toward Japan.[18]

4. Japan Again Proposes a Konoye-Roosevelt Conference (August 7, 1941)

Japanese-American relations were so critical that on August 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura that a policy of “laissez faire” should no longer be pursued. He suggested, therefore, that a conference be held as soon as possible between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt. Though the subjects to be considered would depend greatly on the time at which the conference was held, in general the discussion would be conducted along the lines of the present negotiations.

To save time, the conference would last no longer than a few days, and it was hoped that the delegation would be restricted to a minimum number of persons. Strict secrecy was to be observed until the calling of the conference was definitely agreed upon, at which time a public announcement could be made, if President Roosevelt had no objection. http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de  The Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura that, to ensure secrecy, the American Ambassador in Tokyo was not being advised of this new proposal.[19]

If there were any truth in the rumors concerning the resignation of Secretary Hull and the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura, it would hardly be worthwhile for Japan to propose this conference. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura was requested to investigate immediately and report his findings to Tokyo.[20]

5. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Current American Policy Toward Japan

At approximately the same time that Foreign Minister Toyoda was reprimanding Ambassador Nomura for his failure in making prompt replies to his specific questions, Ambassador Nomura

[13] II, 7.
[14] III, 8.
[15] III, 9.
[16] III, 8. [17] III, 10.
[18] II, 11.
[19] III, 12.
[20] III, 13.

[4]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

submitted a report to Tokyo concerning recent modifications in the policy of the United States toward Japan.[21] Although agreeing that Japanese-American relations had reached an extremely critical stage, Ambassador Nomura commented that such a condition was the inevitable result of Japan’s own action in following other essential policies.

Remarking that the United States believed the Axis nations to be working hand in hand to conquer the world, Ambassador Nomura reported that his insistence in explaining that Japan was guided solely by the principles of the brotherhood of mankind had led to the beginning of unofficial discussions with the Secretary of State. However, the occupation of French Indo-China by Japan had put an end to those same discussions and, according to recent conversations with Secretary Hull and Acting Secretary Welles, the United States had returned to its original position with regard to Japan. Secretary Hull had been bitterly disappointed because he had been very interested in bettering relations between Japan and the United States, and both he and his very good friend, Postmaster General Walker, had been very much embarrassed by the turn of events.

Although American authorities claimed that the policy of the United States toward Japan was not one of unfriendliness, since it was taking measures only to counteract certain steps taken by Japan, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the freezing order and the export embargo issued by the United States, and the joint warning by Secretary Hull and Foreign Minister Eden with regard to Thailand as indications that there was no doubt that the United States was prepared to take drastic action against Japan. Furthermore, in view of the friendly relations between the United States and Russia, Ambassador Nomura doubted that the United States would remain on the sidelines if Japan attacked to the north. Reports of a conference between high British and American military and naval authorities on aid to Russia and the Far Eastern question had attracted Japanese attention.[22]

Ambassador Nomura reminded Tokyo that its Axis partner, Germany, was exercising the utmost precautions in dealing with the United States and had even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt to influence American public opinion. He also pointed out that the trend which was influencing the United States to center its attention on relations with the Japanese would increase in the near future. Ambassador Nomura concluded as follows: I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.[23]

6. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 8, 1941)

(a) State Department Report[24]

At a meeting requested by the Secretary of State, Ambassador Nomura was presented with a reply to the August 6, 1941 proposal of the Japanese government. According to this American document, President Roosevelt had proposed that if the Japanese government would withdraw its forces from French Indo-China, and would refrain from the establishment of bases there by means of its military and naval strength, the government of the United States would guarantee for itself, and would also attempt to obtain from China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, a binding commitment to regard French Indo-China as a neutral country similar to Switzerland.[25] Not only would these governments forego any military act of aggression against

[21] III, 14.
[22] III, 14-15.
[23] III, 14.
[24] “Memorandum of a Conversation”, initialled by Mr. J. W. Ballantine, August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 550-551.
[25] “Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)”, August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 552-553. The English text of this document was sent in Japanese code to Tokyo on August 8, 1941. See III, 16-18.

[5]

French Indo-China, but they would also permit local French authorities to remain undisturbed in the administration of their territory. This proposal, in its entirety, had been subsequently extended to include Thailand.

In view of Japan’s thorough acquaintance with America’s many attempts to found a broad understanding, calculated to establish and maintain a peace in the Pacific which would be beneficial to all the countries concerned, the United States felt that the Japanese proposals of August 6, 1941 were lacking in responsiveness.[26]

After reading the reply of the United States to gain its import, the Japanese representative re-asserted his country’s desire to adjust relations with the United States. As a means of attaining this end, he suggested a conference in Honolulu between the heads of the two governments. Mr. Hull replied that if the conversations between the officials of Japan and the United States had produced a basis for mutual understanding, they would now be able to go forward along a policy of peace. However, the loss of control by the peaceful faction in the Japanese government had proven too formidable an obstacle, and Secretary Hull had been forced to notify the Japanese Ambassador that the measures taken by his government had removed the basis for the “understanding” which they had been discussing.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to stress the alleged encirclement of Japan by the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that the Japanese press was being inspired only to invigorate his people and it was not attempting to counteract the efforts of the government to improve relations with the United States.

When asked by Ambassador Nomura if this constituted an answer to his suggestion that the heads of the two governments should meet, Secretary Hull replied that the responsibility for shaping suitable policies of peace now rested with the Japanese government.[27]

(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[28]

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he had received from the Secretary of State a reply to the proposal he had submitted on August 6, 1941. According to Ambassador Nomura, the document indicated that the United States had not compromised in the least beyond what President Roosevelt had said previously.

To Ambassador Nomura’s proposal that the leaders of the two countries meet for a conference in Hawaii, Secretary Hull replied that the United States had been making preparations for that purpose since Japan had agreed to participate in such a conference. Secretary Hull pointed out, however, that since his talks with Ambassador Nomura had demonstrated that the two countries were in conflict and that Japan’s policy had not been altered, there was no point in holding such conferences. Mr. Ballantine agreed with this statement and declared that the use of force could not go hand in hand with the maintenance of the peace in the Pacific.

Both Secretary Hull and Mr. Welles commented on Japan’s constant prating about an encirclement policy, but Ambassador Nomura replied that though the United States was absolutely safe from the viewpoint of defense, it continued to claim that many dangers were surrounding it in order to have an excuse for expanding its national defense.

Ambassador Nomura was convinced that American authorities would negotiate with Japan only if it stopped further military operations. Believing, in view of this, that there was not the slightest chance of a parley with Japanese officials, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the Japanese Foreign Office have Ambassador Grew in Tokyo stop his activities to bring about the conference of leaders.[29]

[26] S.D., II 552-553. See III, 17-18.
[27] S.D., II, 550-551.
[28] III, 19-20.
[29] Ibid.

[6]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

7. Foreign Minister Toyoda Again Urges a Roosevelt-Konoye Conference

On August 9, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda emphasized to Ambassador Nomura the importance of having the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two nations submitted to President Roosevelt immediately. The Japanese Ambassador was directed to explain to the American President the advantages that would be derived therefrom.[30]

Ambassador Nomura promptly replied that he would call on President Roosevelt as soon as the latter had returned to Washington, and that he would do everything in his power to make a favorable impression. However, the Japanese Ambassador was convinced that as long as Japan proceeded along the lines of its present policy, the United States would not deviate from its established course. After warning Tokyo that the United States considered Japan’s occupation of French Indo-China as a definite indication of an aggression policy, Ambassador Nomura declared that both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were in complete agreement, and that it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes.

In view of the firm stand expressed by the United States on August 6 and August 8, 1941, Ambassador Nomura felt that even the offer of Prime Minister Konoye to come to the United States would not move American authorities to any perceptible degree. Remarking that he did not expect too much from the interview he planned to have with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed his pessimism concerning the present critical state of affairs. He stressed the need for evolving some plan which would persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan.[31]

Three days later Foreign Minister Toyoda sent another urgent message explaining that though the Americans apparently considered the Japanese proposals made in reply to President Roosevelt’s suggestions to be Japan’s final answer, this was not necessarily the impression which Japan intended to convey. Prime Minister Konoye was willing to confer further with the President of the United States along general lines with a view to maintaining world peace.[32]

8. Colonel Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa Are Recalled to Japan

Ambassador Nomura notified Tokyo on August 9, 1941 that Colonel Hideo Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa had returned to Japan aboard the Tatsuta Maru. Expressing his appreciation for the complete cooperation and great help he had received from these officials, Ambassador Nomura asked that certain Japanese authorities be informed of their excellent work.[33]

It will be recalled that Ambassador Nomura had been severely reprimanded by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, when the latter was in office, for having used the term “associates” in describing the status of these assistants.

9. Counselor Iguchi Suggests a Propaganda Campaign in Japan

Counselor Sadao Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy in Washington submitted a report to Secretary Tasiro in Tokyo on August 11, 1941, in which he emphasized the firm attitude of the United States toward Japan, and stressed his belief that the United States would resort to war, if necessary.[34]

Indicating his realization that the Japanese government was fully cognizant of the dangerous situation, Counselor Iguchi commented, however, on the general unawareness of the Japanese public concerning the firm stand being taken by the United States toward Japan. He believed that the Japanese people were guilty of wishful thinking in regard to the United States, and, if the worst came, they would be taken completely by surprise.

[30] III, 21-22.
[31] III, 23-24.
[32] III, 25.
[33] III, 26.
[34] III, 27.

[7]

In view of this, he suggested that the Intelligence Section of the Cabinet or some other group should start a campaign to enlighten the Japanese people concerning the real attitude of the United States, so that they could be prepared for any eventuality. He suggested that the reports, concerning European and American intelligence, issued by the Intelligence Section of the Foreign Office, should contain more concrete information.[35]

10. Prime Minister Toyoda Reprimands Minister Wakasugi

On August 12, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda ordered Minister Wakasugi, who was in Los Angeles, to make no further public comments on the Japanese-American question until he had reported to the Foreign Office in Japan. This reprimand was occasioned by an interview which Minister Wakasugi had given over the international telephone to the Japanese press. The newspaper report had heightened the critical nature of the Japanese-American question because of its effect upon various Japanese groups. Mr. Wakasugi was also directed not to give the impression that he was bearing any important proposals from the United States.[36]

Mr. Wakasugi immediately expressed his amazement that his interview could have made difficult the position of his government in regard to the delicate Japanese-American relations, since he had no other motive than the desire to make a frank and fitting statement. In addition, he had no intention of implying any lessening of America’s responsibility in the matter.[37]

11. Ambassador Nomura Confers with an American Cabinet Member (August 13, 1941)

On August 13, 1941 Ambassador Nomura conferred with an American Cabinet member whose name was not given in the Japanese Ambassador’s report to Tokyo, but who may be presumed to have been Postmaster Frank C. Walker, known to be working behind the scenes with Secretary Hull to effect a peaceful solution to Japanese-American difficulties. Though expressing his conviction that the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had been assisted by Germany’s pressure on the French government, the Cabinet member said that he agreed with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull with regard to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific.[38]

Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan could not remove its troops from French Indo-China at present, but that when a favorable opportunity arose, they would be evacuated. When he mentioned a conference of the leading men of Japan and the United States as a means of surmounting the present crisis, even though a completely satisfactory solution might not be achieved, the American official did not show much enthusiasm, but promised to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull.

Declaring that the American press was paying more attention to Japan than to Germany, Ambassador Nomura referred to newspaper stories suggesting that the United States Navy concentrate all of its forces in the Pacific, and that Britain and the United States pool their navies to ensure having the necessary power in that area. Several writers had commented that Congress would more likely agree to war against Japan than against Germany.[39]

Stating that he would not deny the statements, the American Cabinet member remarked that Japan’s excellent navy would be exceedingly troublesome if combined with that of Germany. Although the United States foresaw future trouble with Russia, it worked jointly with the Soviet Union in order to destroy Hitlerism.

[35] III, Ibid.
[36] III, 28.
[37] III, 29.
[38] III, 30.
[39] Ibid.

[8]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Ambassador Nomura remarked that pressure against Japan was exceedingly harmful. If the Japanese people were to adjust themselves and act in accordance with the policy desired by the United States, then their problems must be handled from an entirely different viewpoint.[40]

12. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 13, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull’s Report[41]

Secretary Hull requested that the Japanese Ambassador call on him on August 13, 1941 to receive a statement citing mistreatment of Americans and injury to American rights in places under Japanese jurisdiction.[42] After the Japanese Ambassador had read the document, Secretary Hull said that he could not understand Japan’s purpose in allowing these injustices to continue, and, therefore, had felt that a summarization of the incidents should be presented to the government of Japan.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly with his views and said that he would be glad to take the matter up with his government. Secretary Hull then informed Ambassador Nomura that he might have other material to present to the Japanese government by Saturday, August 16, 1941, or Sunday, and in answer to a question concerning his availability, the Japanese Ambassador stated that he would be in Washington at that time.

Secretary Hull then introduced a question relating to the alleged promise of Japan not to bomb Chungking after the U.S.S. Tutuila incident.[43] Recounting how the Japanese Ambassador had called on Mr. Welles on July 31, 1941 to express officially to President Roosevelt Japan’s deep regret over the bombing of the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that he had assured the United States that the bombing had been an accident. In order to prevent similar incidents, Japan had promised to suspend all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Japan had requested that this suspension of bombing operations be regarded as strictly confidential and had offered to pay full indemnity for any damage to American properties. At that time, the Japanese Ambassador had informed Mr. Welles that he himself had recommended this procedure to his government.[44]

In view of this action, the American government had considered the incident closed, but on August 8, 10 and 12, 1941 three dispatches had given accounts of new bombings by Japanese planes at Chungking. A telegram dated August 11, 1941, from the American Embassy at Chungking reported that, during the past four days, Chungking had been subjected to unusually heavy and prolonged air raids. Not only had districts outside the city been bombed, but the city area also had been affected, though no bombs had been dropped in the area directly opposite the anchorage of the American gunboat and the United States Chancery. At least one American residence had been demolished, and other residences within the city area had been damaged. In view of these occurrences, the United States requested an explanation and an indication of Japan’s attitude and intentions regarding its pledge of July 31, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador promptly replied that Japan had promised only to cease bombing the city area temporarily and not indefinitely. Although believing that Mr. Welles had understood this stipulation, Ambassador Nomura stated that he might have failed in his efforts to inform the Under Secretary. Nevertheless, he reiterated that this was Japan’s position.[45]

[40] Ibid.
[41] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[42] “The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy”, S.D., I, 908-910; III, 31
[43] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[44] “The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy”, August 12, 1941, S.D., I, 723-724.
[45] S.D., I, 908.

[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[46]

Ambassador Nomura stated that at four o’clock in the afternoon of August 13, 1941 he had called on the Secretary of State, who had handed him the note mentioned above. Secretary Hull had remarked that he had no intention of releasing the note for publication since it would aggravate unduly public opinion. Though there were only a few hundred United States’ citizens in Japan, there were a hundred odd-thousand Japanese in America.  http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de

Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan was taking action to parallel the freezing order of the United States, and was also enacting measures against individuals, similar to those in operation against the Japanese in the United States. However, he felt that such pin-prickings were annoyances which did not affect the general situation; therefore, he hoped that they could be mutually discontinued.

Ambassador Nomura declared that when Secretary Hull had introduced the subject of the Chungking bombings, he had explained that Japan had promised to cease bombing the Chungking suburban areas but only for a certain period. Ambassador Nomura also commented that Secretary Hull’s inquiry concerning his presence in Washington during the latter part of the week indicated that he was planning to issue some sort of a statement.[47]

13. Japan Discounts the Attempted Assassination of Vice Premier Hiranuma

Japan’s eagerness to have Prime Minister Konoye confer with President Roosevelt was evident in a dispatch from Tokyo on August 15, 1941, which denied the erroneous conclusion of some who had interpreted the attempted assassination of Baron Hiranuma, Vice Premier of Tokyo and Minister without Portfolio, as a reaction of Japanese extremists against any cooperation with Britain and the United States.[48]

According to newspaper reports, rumors from diplomatic quarters indicated that an Axis press man had inquired about the Hiranuma shooting some ten hours before it occurred.[49] Emphasizing that his government’s attitude was unshaken despite this unfortunate incident, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that Japanese public opinion would approve any fair revision of national relations regardless of the other party concerned.

Though he was cognizant of Ambassador Nomura’s recent messages concerning the obstacles to further Japanese-American negotiations, Foreign Minister Toyoda again urged that the Japanese Ambassador see President Roosevelt in order to expedite the settlement of broad issues and to prevent a general calamity. The American Ambassador in Tokyo would be advised of Japan’s proposal at the first opportune moment.[50]

14. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 16, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull’s Report[51]

Calling on Secretary Hull in regard to President Roosevelt’s proposal of August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed once more his country’s desire to ensure peaceful relations with the United States, and stated that since Japan would make concessions to avoid war, there was a basis for further progress along this line. The Japanese Ambassador also reiterated his suggestion that high Japanese and American officials meet halfway between the two countries for a conference.

[46] III, 32.
[47] Ibid.
[48] III, 33.
[49] New York Times, August 15, 1941, p. 10:2.
[50] III, 33.
[51] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 16, 1941, S.D., II, 553-554.

[10]  http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

However, when Ambassador Nomura asked whether his conversations with Secretary Hull would be resumed on their former basis, Mr. Hull repeated the circumstances leading up to the cessation of their conversations, but did not pass further on the question or respond favorably. In pointing out that the establishment of bases in and about French Indo-China by the Japanese army, navy, and air forces indicated Japan’s intention to effect a serious invasion of the South Seas areas, which would menace British success in Europe and eventually the safety of the Western Hemisphere, Secretary Hull emphasized the fact that the United States could not remain silent in the face of such a threat. To Ambassador Nomura’s assertion that Japan desired merely to secure necessary commodities, Mr. Hull replied that under a peaceful agreement Japan would have obtained access to world markets.

Since Ambassador Nomura repeatedly stressed the desire of Japan for an amicable settlement of differences and its willingness to make concessions in order to have the conversations resumed, Secretary Hull expressed some interest in this, but pointed to Japan’s continuing policy of conquest by force and to the bitter attacks on the United States by the Japanese government-controlled press. Secretary Hull also suggested that the Japanese Ambassador talk to President Roosevelt and to any other American officials concerning this subject. However, Ambassador Nomura stated that until he had received specific instructions from his own country concerning the concessions it might be willing to make, he could not take such action.[52]

(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[53]

From the intelligence reports which Ambassador Nomura received concerning the recent conference between the leaders of Great Britain and the United States, it appeared that England desired to draw the United States into war with the purpose of utilizing its resources in the Far East. On the other hand, the United States wished to check Great Britain’s ambitions by having it clarify its war aims.

From the joint statement published subsequent to this conference, it was evident, according to the Japanese Ambassador, that the United States had achieved its purpose and that Great Britain had been forced to assume a comparatively disadvantageous position. In view of this report, Ambassador Nomura had considered it essential to confer with Secretary Hull prior to President Roosevelt’s return to Washington. Therefore, on the afternoon of August 16, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had met with the American Secretary of State and had discussed the current situation.

After relaying the instructions which the Japanese government had sent him, Ambassador Nomura stressed the necessity for renewing relations between the two countries, since if the present situation remained unchecked, the outcome would be disastrous. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that a Pacific war would be “mass murder to an unprecedented extent in the history of the world.” Such a war would not be terminated quickly because of any difference in the financial status of Japan and the United States, but instead would develop into a war of complete exhaustion, lasting several years, and would be advantageous to neither country. Therefore, not only should Japan and the United States guard against the extremists in both governments, but they must also be on the lookout against enticing offers made by third countries to both Japan and the United States. Secretary Hull remarked that it had been rumored that Chancellor Hitler had begun the war knowing Commissar Stalin’s attitude well in advance.

At this point Ambassador Nomura strongly refuted the charges that Japan was under military domination by insisting that the characteristics of its imperial family, its government and its people were opposed to militarization. Although Japan advocated a Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity, such a policy was not to be confused with military conquest, since it meant living together by cooperative defense, and, thus, did not differ greatly from the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States.

[52] Ibid.
[53] III, 34.

[11]

After considering Ambassador Nomura’s remark, Secretary Hull stated that the United States recognized the equal status of all countries without the necessity of resorting to the use of arms. Ambassador Nomura replied that external pressure upon Japan had caused it to retaliate, but if this outside pressure were removed, Japan would resort to peaceful measures. Secretary Hull seemed to agree with this statement.

Ambassador Nomura then turned the conversation to the proposed meeting between the leaders of both countries. It was his personal opinion that this meeting should be encouraged rather than discouraged, since many of the measures contained in the Atlantic Charter coincided directly with the statement issued by Prince Konoye, and through both of these documents, an agreement could be reached between the two countries. Indicating that Japan’s only reason for suggesting a conference with the United States was to improve the present diplomatic situation, the Japanese Ambassador asked if the United States still deemed such a conference impossible.

Although he had not yet taken up the matter with anyone outside of his own office, Secretary Hull promised to confer with President Roosevelt at the earliest opportunity. According to Ambassador Nomura, this attitude was much different from Secretary Hull’s earlier position and was probably the result of his having talked with the Cabinet members who had conferred with the Japanese Ambassador. When Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura’s personal opinion on the general outlook, the Japanese Ambassador replied that it would be extremely dangerous to let Japanese-American relations remain in their present condition.[54]

15. Ambassador Nomura Summarizes the Japanese-American Diplomatic Situation (August 16, 1941)

In summarizing the Japanese-American diplomatic situation on August 16, 1941, Ambassador Nomura warned that anything might happen at any moment. As soon as Japan made another move, particularly if it were directed against Thailand, matters would grow suddenly worse. Though he had reported that America was not united in regard to participation in the European war and that President Roosevelt himself was hesitant, the Japanese Ambassador emphasized that the American people were unanimous in regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. This would meet with the approval of Great Britain, China and Germany.[55]

Expressing his belief that President Roosevelt would not go to extremes inasmuch as both he and American naval authorities were conscious of the tremendous tasks involved in a Pacific war, Ambassador Nomura stated that the British believed that if a Japanese-American war were started, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war.

The Japanese Ambassador pointed out that Allied confidence in ultimate victory was gaining, for even if Germany eventually defeated Russia, the war would not have been short and decisive, since it had already reached the stage of attrition. Furthermore, since submarine war in the Atlantic was being won by Britain and the United States, the situation closely resembled that of 1917.[56]

With such a state of affairs in the United States, Ambassador Nomura had been very anxious to have the State Department approve Foreign Minister Toyoda’s proposal for a conference of Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt, but Secretary Hull had rejected it. Ambassador Nomura’s efforts to interest a Cabinet member who was intimately associated with Secretary Hull failed. President Roosevelt at one time had thought of arranging a similar conference, but Japan’s occupation of French Indo-China had led him to believe that Japan did

[54] Ibid.
[55] III, 35.
[56] III, 36.

[12]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

not desire a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations, but was only conducting a policy of appeasement towards the United States.

Ambassador Nomura reported that American authorities were beginning to think that he had been misled by his own country.[57]

Since Japanese newspapers had severely criticized a statement recently issued by the American government, the atmosphere had become worse. Ambassador Nomura advised that unless something were done immediately to eliminate this misunderstanding, he would not be able to accomplish his objective. Furthermore, since President Roosevelt was unfavorable to the proposal, Ambassador Nomura did not expect him to do anything about it.

Indicating three critical points concerning which the United States wished Japan to give some sort of a pledge, namely, the question of self-defense, the withdrawal of troops from China, and non-discrimination in trade, Ambassador Nomura requested that the Japanese Foreign Office consider them and send him any further instructions at once. Thus, he would be prepared for an interview with President Roosevelt who was returning to Washington within a few days.[58]

16. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (August 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull’s Report[59]

In an informal conference between President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador, called at Mr. Roosevelt’s request, the strained relations between the two countries were discussed. After President Roosevelt had contrasted the policies and principles of the American government with Japan’s course of conquest by force, and had asserted that the next move toward peace now depended upon Japan, Ambassador Nomura produced an instruction which he said was from his government. It emphasized Japan’s hopes for a mutual understanding, and expressed Prince Konoye’s willingness to attend a conference with President Roosevelt at some point halfway between Japan and the United States.

President Roosevelt then commented that since the relations between the two governments should be brought up-to-date, he had prepared an oral statement clarifying the position of the United States. He regretted the necessity for having to do so, but there was no other recourse. President Roosevelt read the oral statement to the Japanese Ambassador and then handed him the document containing it.[60]

In his oral statement President Roosevelt indicated that in protracted conversations during the past months Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura had attempted to formulate a mutual understanding, based on the preclusion of force by either country, in order to maintain peace and justice in the Pacific. On July 24, 1941 President Roosevelt had offered to urge the governments of China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to join the United States in a solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and would make all markets and materials of Indo-China available to all nations on equal terms, provided that Japan withdrew its forces from this area.

In spite of these efforts, the Japanese government had continued its military activities throughout the Far East and had occupied Indo-China. Although the American government was in full sympathy with Japanese desires for amicable and mutually profitable relations with the United States, it was now deemed necessary to warn Japan that a continuation of its program of military domination of neighboring countries by force or threat of force, would com-

[57] III, 37.
[58] III, 38.
[59] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 554-555.
[60] Ibid.

[13]

pel the United States to take any and all steps deemed necessary to ensure the legitimate rights and interests, the safety and the security of the United States and its citizens.[61]

After a slight pause, President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of Ambassador Nomura’s request for a resumption of the conversations with Secretary Hull. Making further reference to Japan’s policy of conquest by force, and to the bitter denunciation of America by the Japanese government-controlled press, President Roosevelt pointed out that under such conditions the reopening of conversations would be fruitless. President Roosevelt then read another document to Ambassador Nomura, which he afterwards handed to him.

In this second statement, President Roosevelt declared in regard to the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador that responsible officials of Japan and the United States meet to discuss the adjustment of present relations, and with reference to Ambassador Nomura’s desire that the previous informal conversations be resumed, that the Secretary of State had already advised Ambassador Nomura that the United States could not see how the conversations could be pursued if Japan continued its present policy of force and supported the bitter press attacks against America.[62]

On two occasions, officers from the Department of State had expressed concern over the impending Japanese offensive in French Indo-China. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23, 1941, the Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, had informed Ambassador Nomura that the United States believed Japan to be embarking on a program of conquest in the South Pacific area, and since the position of the American government had already been clearly defined, there could be no basis for further conversations.

President Roosevelt pointed out that in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the entire Pacific situation, a progressive program would have to be evolved from the basic principle of equal commercial opportunity and treatment for all nations. With the cooperation of the countries concerned in this area, all available resources of capital, technical skill, and economic leadership would be utilized not only for building up their own economies, but also for developing regions where productive capacity could be improved which would increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, would raise standards of living, and would create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. However, any disruption of the peace would find the United States continuing its policy of sending immediate aid to the areas within the Pacific which were resisting aggression.

Since this program would prevent any country from extending its military, political or economic control over other peoples, the United States felt that it assured to Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations. If the Japanese government would agree to suspend its expansionist activities and readjust its position along peaceful lines, the American government was prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July. However, to clarify the situation for both governments, it would be advantageous if the Japanese government furnished a clearer statement than had yet been presented concerning its present attitude and plans.[63]

(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[64]

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 18, 1941 that at half-past four in the afternoon of August 18, 1941[65] he had had a secret interview with President Roosevelt in the presence of Secretary Hull.

[61] “Oral statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)”, August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 556-557. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[62] “Statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)”, August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 557-559. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[63] Ibid.
[64] III, 41-47.
[65] This should be August 17, 1941. See III, 40.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire.

green 6.gre.000200 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire .  In centuries past throughout the world, windmills dotted bucolic landscapes, where millers ground cereal grains into flour. Later, farms and ranches harnessed the power of the wind to pump water. Although most farms and mills now run on electricity, wind power’s appeal is reemerging. Several major food companies are investing in wind farms to cover all or part of their substantial electricity needs. http://louis_j_sheehan.today.com

On Jan. 25, the Environmental Protection Agency recognized the top 25 institutions committed to making significant investments this year in ecologically responsible, “green” power systems—especially wind farms.

The Air Force topped EPA’s new list, with a commitment to buy more than 1 million megawatt-hours (mWh) of renewably generated power—electricity equal to 11 percent of its projected use. Food companies came in second, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth place, a remarkable showing for one industry. http://louis_j_sheehan.today.com

Electricity moves about the U.S. power grid like water through a network of streams. Power created in one place may be consumed locally or more than 1,000 miles away, depending on how electrons get shunted through the system.

Some farmers have installed turbines on their land to serve not only their own needs but to produce a crop of electrons to sell into a regional electrical grid (SN: 7/21/01, p. 45). Companies and institutions on EPA’s new list, by contrast, are investing in a host of green-power systems including biomass energy and solar power. However, because wind-generated electricity is among the more affordable of alternative electricity-generating options, the majority of investments by institutions on EPA’s new top-25 list—including those of all the food-related companies—went to wind power.

Green-power investors buy some share of the output of renewable-energy facilities, such as wind farms, and receive credit that can be exchanged for a comparable amount of power from a local utility.

The grocery chain Whole Foods Market, number two on EPA’s green list, has committed to buying more green energy this year than even EPA itself buys for its many offices and operations. Both Whole Foods and Starbucks—number six on the green list—have purchased more green energy than the U.S. Energy Department has for its own operations.

The other food companies on EPA’s greenest-25 list are Safeway and WhiteWave.

Institutions on the list that don’t make food their major business: Johnson & Johnson, the World Bank Group, the U.S. General Services Administration, HSBC North America, the city of San Diego, New Jersey Consolidated Energy Savings Program, Advanced Micro Devices, Staples, the Austin (Tex.) Independent School District, Mohawk Fine Papers, the Tower Companies, FedEx Kinko’s, the Army’s Fort Carson, the University of Pennsylvania, Montgomery County in Maryland, a consortium of Dallas-area hotels, Western Washington University, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Science News Online contacted the food companies on EPA’s new list to find out what prompted them to go green.

Whole Foods (Green-Power Ranking: 2)

This 25-year-old Austin, Texas–based grocery chain—renowned for promoting natural and organic foods—has 180 stores, all but 10 of them in the United States. “We felt that as we were becoming a larger company, we needed to really give back to our community and the environment,” explains Margaret Wittenberg, the firm’s vice president for communications and quality standards.

Last Dec. 9, the company purchased wind-power credits to offset all of its projected North American power needs for 2006—some 458,000 megawatt-hours of electricity. It was the largest wind-energy purchase in U.S. history, the company announced last month, “and makes Whole Foods Market the only Fortune 500 company purchasing wind energy credits to offset 100 percent of its electricity use.” Previously, 20 percent of the company’s stores were purchasing some type of renewable energy.

Enlarge

This new recycled-paper cup is another way Starbucks is reducing its environmental footprint.Starbucks Coffee Co.

“Conventional electricity generation is the largest industrial source of air pollution in the United States, and wind power is a clean and renewable alternative,” says Kurt Johnson, who directs EPA’s Green Power Partnership program, which compiled the new list. “Whole Foods Market’s commitment to wind power is providing an outstanding example of environmental leadership.”

Whole Foods purchased its credits from the wind-power broker Renewable Choice Energy of Boulder, Colo. The total should match the electricity demand by its stores, bakeries, and operations facilities this year. “This wasn’t just a 1-year trial,” Wittenberg says, but something the company plans to invest in over the long term.

Wittenberg won’t give financial figures but acknowledges that her company’s wind credits cost more than conventional electricity. Typically, wind power costs about 2 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) more than conventionally generated electricity. “But for us it’s cost-neutral,” says Wittenberg, since the company will finance the extra from savings elsewhere in its budget.

Green power is part of an overall trend for the company in reducing its environmental footprint. For instance, some of its stores use solar panels to generate electricity on-site. Some Whole Foods trucks run on biodiesel—a conventional-fuel substitute made from food or crop wastes (SN: 12/5/98, p. 364). Several stores—including the company’s flagship grocery in Austin—even compost food wastes and sell the product to gardeners.

Starbucks (Green-Power Ranking: 6)

“Agricultural-based companies have reason to be concerned about the long-term implications of climate change on very sensitive ecosystems,” says Ben Packard of Starbucks Coffee Co. That’s why his firm bumped up its purchase of green power from the equivalent of 5 percent of the firm’s electricity consumption by North American company-owned stores last year to 20 percent this year.

EPA equates Starbucks’ green-power total to eliminating 237 million pounds of carbon dioxide that would be spewed if conventional fossil-fueled plants were used to meet the company’s electricity needs.

This green-power initiative is consistent with Starbuck’s longstanding goal to become a corporate leader in social and environmental responsibility, Packard says. He points to the company’s policy of:

• Paying premium prices for its coffee to help farmers in developing countries make a fair income.
• Operating a center in Costa Rica that provides local farmers the technical training and aid needed to produce high-quality coffees while preserving the environment.
• Purchasing substantial amounts of coffee from shade-grown plants, which conventionally don’t yield as much as full-sun coffee plants but are more likely to attract natural pollinators, which increase yields without the use of environmentally damaging fertilizers and pesticides (see The Buzz over Coffee).
• And creating and supporting a Coffee and Farmer Equity (CAFE) project that favors farmers and coffee suppliers that demonstrate they’re sustaining the environment and trading coffee fairly.

Those are behind-the-scenes changes that customers don’t see. This month, however, the company will start handing customers paper cups that are better for the environment than the stores’ cups are now.

Worldwide this year, Starbucks expects to dispense some 1.9 billion paper cups. Those in North America will incorporate 10 percent post-consumer recycled paper fiber. This might not sound like much, says Packard, but no other company has gotten Food and Drug Administration support to use recycled-paper packaging in direct contact with food or drink.

“We anticipate that the switch . . . is going to lower our use of new tree fiber by a little over 5 million pounds,” Packard says, which will eliminate the logging of some 60,000 trees. On Jan. 24, the National Recycling Coalition presented Starbucks with its “Recycling Works Award.” The prize recognized the company for a range of activities, but especially its 8-year effort to bring a recycled paper cup to the marketplace.

Safeway (Green-Power Ranking: 8)

Last September, Safeway Inc. became the largest purchaser of renewable energy in California, its home state. This national supermarket chain purchased wind credits for 78,000 mWh—enough electricity to power all 270 of the company’s gas stations, 15 of its grocery stores in the San Francisco Bay area, and its two corporate campuses.

Although the green-power commitment was for this year only, “in the future we do hope to expand our purchases . . . powering more of our operations with wind or another form of renewable energy,” says spokesperson Teena Massingill.

She says that the green-power purchase is part of a trend—”to be as environmentally friendly as possible”—that the company has been phasing in during stores’ construction and renovation. For instance, many of the company’s facilities are cutting back on electric lighting and making greater use of natural light through skylights. More subdued illumination “makes for a friendlier shopping environment” while cutting the company’s electric bills, Massingill says.

Safeway announced that its wind energy “will come solely from newly constructed wind-turbine generators.”

WhiteWave (Green-Power Ranking: 14)

WhiteWave—the company that makes Silk, a soy-based milk alternative—started investing in wind power in 2003. Last year, the Broomfield, Colo.–based company became a wholly owned subsidiary of Dean Foods in Dallas, which markets the Horizon brand of organic dairy products.

This year, WhiteWave is offsetting 100 percent of its projected electricity use in manufacturing Silk and Horizon products—almost 50,000 mWh—with wind credits. Such green-power investments are expected to “continue inching up,” notes the company’s Ellen Feeney.

Green power is “in keeping with our culture [of] a real nuts-and-bolts organic lifestyle.” Wind investments are just one feature of WhiteWave’s environmental program. Indeed, Feeney notes, the company’s new headquarters is pushing recycling to the limit—even to the point of composting food scraps from kitchens used by employees.

This “ecosensitivity,” Feeney says, is not only what the employees want, but also what studies have shown appeal to the company’s core customers, made up primarily of baby boomers.

Other greens

Most of the companies on EPA’s new top-25 list are investing in wind-generated electricity. However, it’s hardly their only green option. The agency invites public and private institutions to consider solar and geothermal energy, small hydropower systems, and biofuels such as wood, straw, manure, and methane.

In an effort to wean the United States from its addiction to fossil fuels, EPA offers a “green power locator” map, where homeowners and corporate managers can find companies marketing renewable energy credits in their area, if not nationally (http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/locator/md.htm). For instance, Maine Power Options (http://www.mainepoweroptions.org/GreenPower.htm) offers buyers credits for a 50:50 mix of biomass- and hydropower-generated electricity, and it markets these credits to power users as far away as California and Washington State. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire .

seek 7.see.001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

In Greek mythology, the lad Narcissus wasted away because he couldn’t bear to stop staring at his reflection in a pool of water. Although people have a stranglehold on such narcissistic pursuits, dolphins recognize their own reflections much as folks do, according to a new study.

The findings, published in the May 8 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, support a theory that the neural capacity for at least a basic type of self-awareness evolved separately in dolphins and humans.

“We’ve documented a level of self-awareness in bottlenose dolphins that occurs rarely in the animal world,” says psychobiologist Diana Reiss of Columbia University. Reiss conducted the new experiments with psychologist Lori Marino of Emory University in Atlanta.

Before these trials, two captive-raised dolphins had ignored sham ink applications that left no visible marks. After the investigators marked with temporary ink on various parts of the dolphin’s bodies, the animals began perusing the marks by positioning themselves in front of mirrors in their enclosure.

After the dolphins repeatedly viewed reflections of the real ink marks, the researchers repeated the sham marking. This time, the dolphins tried to find mirror images of the sham marks, confirming the presence of a self-aware curiosity, Reiss and Marino argue.

The researchers videotaped the adult dolphins during a series of 30-minute sessions after application of either a visible mark or a later sham. Mark locations varied from one trial to the next. Examples include just above the right eye, behind the top fin, and below the left, bottom fin.

Each dolphin repeatedly maneuvered his body in front of the mirrors to scrutinize visible marks and hunt for ensuing sham marks, the researchers say. This self-directed behavior, including neck stretching and body turning, lasted for periods ranging from 10 seconds to the entire videotaped period.

While searching for marks, the dolphins didn’t display any social behaviors, such as threatening squawks, that might be expected if they regarded the reflection as another dolphin. Moreover, in sessions during which they received no real or sham markings, the dolphins spent little time looking in the mirrors.

In 1970, psychologist Gordon G. Gallup Jr. of the State University of New York at Albany first reported that dye-marked chimpanzees examined the colored spots in mirrors. Some scientists suspect that this reflects unthinking self-recognition, or mistaking of a mirror image for another animal, rather than reflective self-awareness (SN: 1/20/96, p. 42).

That criticism may apply to the dolphin findings as well, Gallup comments. “The new dolphin findings are interesting but not definitive,” he says. An earlier, less widely noticed study of mirror looking by marked dolphins also indicated that dolphins recognize themselves, but Gallup considers the methodology of the new study to be more sophisticated.  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

Janet Mann of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., who studies wild dolphins, says that it’s no surprise that dolphins recognize themselves in mirrors. Still, in her view, it’s unclear what this reveals about dolphins’ mental lives. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

Wild dolphins exhibit behavior indicative of self-awareness (SN: 10/28/00, p. 284). Gallup and Mann both say that scientists need to probe for self-awareness in complex situations, such as by looking for deception among dolphins. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

In the wild, for instance, Mann has observed an adult female being surrounded by three aggressive males and seeking refuge in an all-female group. Some of the females rubbed against the hovering males and stroked them with their fins, diverting attention. Another female blocked the males’ view of the escapee and escorted her until she could safely dart off. At that point, the males seemed to recognize that they’d been duped. After vainly searching for their quarry, the trio attacked the escort.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire