Relayed to England, United States, Germany, Italy and Turkey 1.eusgitr.0 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 213

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Hongkong

April 1, 1941

# 75.

After working out a plan to have some Chinese at your disposal, to mingle directly or indirectly through local contacts (for instance, To, etc.) with Chinese residents in Manila for the purpose of obtaining intelligence regarding the extent of their participation in the defense program (or the Islands), which may be useful to us in our future plans, please take necessary steps, on my responsibility, if the reply [a] to my message # 103 [a] to Manila warrants it.

[a] See I, 214.

Trans. 5-27-41

No. 214

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Manila

April 1, 1941

# 103.

(Secret.)

Regarding your # 129 [a].

After referring to this Minister’s message to Hongkong # 75 [b], please check up on the extent of participation by the Chinese residents in the Philippines’ defense plan and wire same to Hongkong. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Also depending on conditions there, please consider extending our activities along the lines of my message # 75 [b].

[a]Not available.

[b] See I, 213.

Trans. 5-27-41

Page A-116

No. 215

FROM: Peiping

TO: Tokyo

April 21, 1941

# 275.

Referring to my # 264 [a].

A member of the American Embassy staff informed one of our officers that their Embassy guard is to be reduced by fifty men. This report appears to be true.

[a] Previous message stated: “We have checked up on rumors of a reported evacuation of U.S. troops from North China to Manila but find that although the band of 30 members will be transferred to Shanghai, reliefs for sentrymen will continue as heretofore.”

Trans. 5-3-41

No. 216

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington

April 24, 1941

# 181.

According to an intelligence, the American State Department is now considering closing the Panama Canal to all nations save the Pan American countries. This is directed at Japan and France, although

http://Louis2J2Sheehan.US

they will avoid specifically naming us.

For your information.

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 217

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

May 7, 1941

# 105.

(Circular). Action Tokyo as # 141.

The newspapers here published on the 7th a Tokyo A.P. dispatch reporting that Tokyo shipping circles were concerned over the San Francisco rumor of the 5th, to the effect that the American government would probably close the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping not later than the 10th.

Relayed to Washington, Buenos Aires.

Trans. 5-12-41

No. 218

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Washington

May 6, 1941

# 195.

According to a wire that has reached this Minister from our Ministry in Spain, the Spanish Foreign Minister in order to contribute to the maintenance of Britain’s position in the Mediterranean Sea is said to Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire be setting up a plan for the transportation of arms and munitions for North Africa. Not so very long ago an American official was dispatched to Morocco in order to speed up preparations for joint British and American machinations in the Mediterranean area.

Page A-117

The British will not take direct action toward Spain for the present but, in the event of American participation in the war, it is said that there will be considerable danger of this. As Spain, as long as the British do not take military action against her, it appears that she would like to continue her neutral status as heretofore.

Furthermore, the Brazilian Ambassador, who is considered to be the best informed of the Madrid diplomatic corps, is understood to have observed that the war will be a long one and that there are indications that the United States will participate in the war within a period of two months.

This is for your information.

Trans. 5-8-41

No. 219

FROM: Nanking

TO: Tokyo

April 15, 1941

# 229.

(Secret)

1. We hear that the government, with a view to seeking the aid of the President of the United States for a speedy settlement of the Japan-China incident, has recently sent instructions to Ambassador Nomura to confer with the President in regard to terms of peace. Is this true?

2. In connection with Shanghai’s # 589 [a] to the Foreign Office, as to this item’s having originated in Chungking, I have heard it from other quarters as well. In fact, it is quite generally believed that the real origin of it is KASUMIGASEKI (The Foreign Office).

I wonder just to what extent the activities of Yamazaki, mentioned in the Shanghai reference msg, have the approval of the Foreign Minister.

It seems to me that, for my “guidance” in the performance of my duties, I ought to be advised at least as to the main points in regard to such important steps in the handling of the incident. Therefore, I respectfully make this inquiry, and beg of you to give me some instruction.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-21-41

No. 220

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Washington

March 4, 1941

Message to Tokyo # 264.

The American Ambassador (Steinhardt) had told me that he hoped to return to the United States in March and at that time to exchange views with your Excellency, but it seems that he was informed by his home government that his return home could not be permitted at the present time when the European situation is so grave. In several conversations with the American Ambassador he told me certain things, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire the most important of which I feel it necessary to give here for your information.

1. He has pointed out to me repeatedly that it would be of no advantage at all to Japan to conclude a political treaty with the hostile Soviet Union and that as a result of such action

Page A-118

I we might be making a sacrifice. He also stated that he did not believe that the Japanese people would feature such a matter and spoke in a manner very antagonistic to the idea. I think that was upon this subject that he wished to talk to your Excellency and this is further substantially proven by what CRAIGIE [a] told you the other day.

2. The American Ambassador expressed a surprising degree of dissatisfaction with his negotiations with the Soviet officials. He said that for three weeks he had been unable to have interview with MOLOTOV [b] and that Washington-Moscow negotiations are not proceeding harmoniously.

3. He said: “If you Japanese are satisfied with French-Indo-China, well and good. The United States will put up with that; but if you go any further south, it will be dangerous. You know, if the United States gets into this war, it is going to be truly a world war and that is some I thing to worry about”. I replied: “Well, on your part you must not clamp down a petroleum embargo on us Japanese, and also you must not keep sending soldiers into the South Seas. Our action will depend on what you do in that connection”. He replied: “In my opinion, the States is not going to exercise a petroleum embargo against you”. I asked: “If Germany succeeds in an invasion of the British Empire, will the United States fight?” He replied: “No, I do not think that even then the United States will fight”. I attacked Great Britain’s rapacious world policy and said that Italy and Germany’s turn had come to take charge of the European continent”.

4. He said: “Hitler is sooner or later going to attack the Soviet Union and I think he may do so in the course of the present war. What do you think?” I replied: “Yes, I think that will take place. However, I don’t think that the German Army is now sufficiently strong to attempt such a feat. Very probably they will have to wait until after the war is over. As for us Japanese, we have no such intention at the present time.”

Now, this possibility is like throwing cold water on the Soviet and there is danger of attempts to divorce the Tri-Partite Alliance from Moscow.

Relay to Manchukuo. Relayed to Germany, Italy, England and United States.

[a] British Ambassador to Tokyo.

[b] Soviet Premier and Foreign Minister.

Trans. 3-8-41

No. 221

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: London and Rome

February 10, 1941

Message to Tokyo # 175.

The following is the gist of the conversation I had with the American Ambassador:

1. “In so far as I know, United States relations with Japan have been gradually improving during the last sixteen days.”

2. “Soviet Russia is pleading with the United States Government for freighters, tin, rubber, etc. As to freighters, we are selling her a few; however, as to machinery, we have not any surplus because our industries are busy manufacturing armaments. The United States herself is suffering from lack of rubber and tin. For these reasons trade negotiations with Soviet Russia  are experiencing a great deal of difficulty.”

Page A-119

3. The American Ambassador has told me that he is returning to his country in March unaccompanied and that on his way back he would like to call on you. I also have been urging him to do so.

Relayed to England, United States, Germany, Italy and Turkey.

Trans. 2-15-41

crushed 6.cru.073 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 79

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

9 May 1941

No Number.

To the Vice Minister [a], from Wakasugi. [b]

I respectfully acknowledge receipt of your telegram [c].

Because of various duties at this office it requires a long time for a secretary alone to handle long messages and the increased volume of traffic in connection with this matter [d].

(My message # 272 [e] required 6 men working for 6 hours.)

With the opening of negotiations, the volume of telegraphic traffic is bound to increase tremendously. As time is at a premium in handling these communications, you can well ap-

Page A-55

preciate the inadvisability of having only the secretary handle this work. Furthermore, it goes without saying that the increased traffic will interfere greatly with other duties of this office.

However, fortunately, our communication clerks have been constantly reminded of the necessity of maintaining security, and they have faithfully adhered to this policy in their work.

Although I appreciate the intent of your telegram [c] from the standpoint of security, I nevertheless request your authorization to enlist the aid of Horiuchi, Hori, and Kazuwara to handle communication duties under strict supervision.

Also please authorize me to have Kawabata of Chicago come here temporarily to assist us in our communication work. (Bring all codes and do his work in this office.)

[a] Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi.

[b] Japanese Minister to Washington, under Ambassador Nomura.

[c] See I, 77, unnumbered, dated 8 May in which Tokyo issues Washington special regulations for custody of the Chief of Mission private code.

[d] Japanese-American negotiations, being conducted in great secrecy.

[e] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 80

FROM: Washington

TO: Tokyo

May 13, 1941

No Number.

To Acting Vice Minister Yamamoto from Wakasugi.

I have no doubt that you are giving consideration to the matter of having additional telegraphic secretaries and telegraphic clerks. If, however, matters are allowed to go on the way they are, there is danger that we will have some sick people on our hands.

Will you please, therefore, give consideration to the contents of the last paragraph of my message [a] sent on the 9th, in which I asked for Kawasata to come to help us out. If this cannot be arranged could you have one or two persons having fair ability sent to us from one of our offices in this vicinity?

[a] See I, 103-107.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 81

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

7 May 1941

# 273.

2 parts-complete

Regarding your # 191 [a].

I called on the Secretary of State during the morning of the 7th with regard to the “oral statement” and the neutrality pact.

The Secretary told me that he was fully aware of the sincere efforts I was making to correct and improve the relations between the two countries, and the neutrality pact.

He went on to say that the time at which the United States must act, and act speedily, was practically at hand, and it was necessary to move before it was too late. Hitlerism cannot be

Page A-56

permitted to reach all of the seven seas. The United States, with defense as the main objective, shall protect her rights and interests (every country has an equal right to do this, he added) and will resist Hitlerism to the end, even if this takes ten or twenty years. He repeated that this was necessary from the viewpoint of defense.

“All of my colleagues,” he said, “urge me to act quickly.” They warned him not to hesitate, or procrastinate and that immediate action is needed if he does not want to be too late.

He strongly advocated the commencement of U.S.-Japanese negotiations. I have never before heard him use so enthusiastic a tone or language as on this occasion.

(Part 2)

Regarding the Neutrality Pact, (I also referred to the possibility of he and I exchanging notes containing the gist of the “understanding pact”, in the event that the neutrality pact was an impossibility) the Secretary apparently is of the attitude that it would be entirely useless for him to discuss this matter with me, if I have not been given any instructions from my government. Apparently, he has no intention of touching on this phase. (He said that he had turned this matter over to his advisors for their consideration. They unofficially state that something may be done about a neutrality pact after an “understanding” agreement is entered into. At present, however, from the viewpoint of domestic politics, it would be impossible to enter into anything resembling a neutrality pact. Moreover, since practically all of the problems between the U.S. and Japan are contained in the “understanding” agreement, they feel that its consideration should be the immediate task, the Secretary said.)

The Secretary said also that he could see some points in the “understanding” agreement which should be revised to make it applicable to the signatory nations.

If I were to express my opinion, I would say that in view of the present critical world conditions, and more particularly, in view of the present attitude of the United States, this is no longer the time for propaganda, bluffing, and feeling out each other. Looking at the whole situation from our country, I firmly believe that now is the time to give way to great statesmanship. Now is the time, I feel, for us to make a determined effort to regain good relations between the two countries.

During the conversations, he said that he knows Hitler equally as well as Mr. Matsuoka does. Then he added, “I may be wrong”.

In view of the fact that this matter has been kept a deep secret heretofore, and because we have been holding conferences at various times under promises of their being “off the record”, I have not handed the Oral Statement over. Please be aware of this.

Because of the various circumstances outlined above, will you please arrange to commence negotiations along the lines of the “understanding” agreement immediately.

[a] See I, 67-Text of note to be handed to Secretary Hull.

Trans. 5-7-41

PAGE A-57

No. 82

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)

TO: Washington

May 8, 1941

# 200.

Urgent.

Your message # 273 [a] was communicated to me by telephone twice today, once in the morning and in the afternoon. I made a reply by telephone. On that occasion I stated that it was my intention to make publication within four or five days at the very latest. Furthermore, on the basis of this Minister’s oral statement, as I would like to submit it for the President’s perusal, please make presentation of it immediately to Secretary of State HULL requesting him to, in turn, hand it over to the President.

[a] See I, 81. Nomura reports conversation with Secretary Hull during the morning of the 7th with regard to the “oral statement” and the neutrality pact.

Trans. 5-9-41

No. 84

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

7 May 1941

# 277.

Part 1 of 8.

Foreign Office secret.

Supplementary to my message # 273 [a].

1. Recently, especially since the passage of the National Defense Act, the real political and economic powers in the United States have practically entirely been placed in the hands of President Roosevelt. The trend towards a dictatorship is constantly becoming more and more evident and unmistakable.

Practically all of the more influential newspapers and other organs of communication are being manipulated and guided by Roosevelt. In other words, the so-called “public opinion” is an instrument which is being cleverly manufactured by the President. As evidence of this, it is apparent that neither the politicians nor the commentators and the critics of such organizations as the “America First” cannot soften or change the so-called “public opinion” manufactured by Roosevelt.

Supplementing this, all persons who protest or oppose the Rooseveltian policies, are being given a figurative death sentence by being branded traitors or spies. In other words, I am of the opinion that the freedom of expression of one’s thoughts is rapidly becoming non-existent.

[a] See I, 81.

Trans. 5-12-41

Page A-58

No. 85

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

7 May 1941

# 277.

Part 2 of 8.

The persons who were formerly considered the brains of the Roosevelt administration have gradually been removed until of late the only ones who remain close to the President are Hopkins, Walker (for 20 years this man has supported Roosevelt and was business manager of Roosevelt’s third term campaign, and is now Postmaster General), and Hull. Even these men, although they are quite influential in having the power to make suggestions, apparently do not have the final say. The decisions in practically all of the more important matters are being made by none other than the President himself.

It is now a certainty that when I made my recent proposals to the United States that only the Secretary of the Navy, besides the above mentioned three persons, was present at the conference with the President to discuss it. It is fairly definite that Stimson as well as the other Cabinet officials and the State Department officers were all left out of the conference. Hull, it is reported, announced to the Undersecretary of State and to the other higher-ups in his department, that matters pertaining to United States-Japanese relations were things that would be decided by the extreme head of the government.

While on this subject, I might mention that Roy Howard, who has been utilized by this Embassy in the past, and with whom you are on friendly terms, is at present a member of the “outs” as far as the President is concerned, since the journalist not only opposed him in the third term campaign but also opposed the National Defense Act when it was being discussed.

Trans. 5-12-41

No. 36

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

7 May 1941

# 277.

Part 3 of 8.

The great majority of the American people, including the President, look upon this war as a battle between totalitarianism and democracy.

In general the people are convinced of the following points:

That totalitarianism is an enemy of humanitarianism since it refuses to recognize the liberty of an individual;

That though aggressions may, temporarily, seem successful, in the long run they are all doomed to failure and they give Caesar and Napoleon as examples;

That they must aid England which is a self-claimed democracy, to the bitter end;

That there is a possibility that the German-British war will develop into a German-U. S. war.

The American people are so convinced of the above points that it would be an impossibility for anyone, regardless of the amount of effort he may make, to change them. This condition is true today, and will be true in the future. It has come to such a point as to almost automatically brand one a traitor who, with the best intentions, offers even a word of warning.

Most Americans believe by wishful thinking, that this European war will develop into a long term affair and that if, during this time, the U.S. goes into aiding Britain on a large scale,

PAGE A-58

the German side (including Italy) will certainly be crushed. There are, among the American people, those such as Lindbergh who oppose the popular belief that Germany will certainly be crushed. However, I am of the opinion that only a small minority support these men. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 5-12-41

apparently 3.app.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

ynopsis

The boys build a snowman, and when one (mostly resembling Kyle, but is unnamed) tries to put a top hat on it, another (also unnamed,    Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  but resembling Stan) warns not to. The hat is put on anyway, and the snowman immediately comes to life, but is evil, with a menacing and sinister look on his face. Tentacles emerge from “Frosty”, and he grabs one kid (resembling Cartman) and throws him into the snow, killing him. “Kyle” shouts “Oh my God, Frosty killed Kenny!” Apparently, his name is Kenny, however there is another boy that resembles Kenny, except Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire he occasionally speaks intelligibly. The surviving boys go to Santa for help, but he turns out to be Frosty in disguise and kills the boy resembling Kenny. The other two boys come upon a nativity scene, and beseech the baby Jesus for help in killing Frosty. A tiny Jesus emerges, with a baby’s body and a large, bearded head, and takes after Frosty. The diminutive savior throws his halo at Frosty’s hat like a boomerang, knocking it off and making the snowman once more inanimate.

Full Recap

The episode starts off with the four boys, Stan, Kyle, Kenny and Cartman singing a Christmas carol when the song gets interrupted by Stan who remembered that Kyle was Jewish. After asking Kyle why he was singing Christmas songs, he tells him to sing Hanukkah songs. Kyle starts singing “The Dreidel Song” and almost momentarily Stan and Cartman criticize the song and end up having a war of the words between each other. Jesus comes down from heaven to stop all the fighting and tells the kids that not all is right and that he needs to find a place called the “mall.” The kids offer to bring him there.

On arriving at the mall Stan asks Jesus what he is looking for, Jesus reply’s “Him!” pointing in Santa’s direction. Santa exclaims “Ho, ho, ho, so we meet again Jesus.” while he was listening to what little children wanted for Christmas. Jesus accuses Santa of ruining the spirit of Christmas and Jesus tells Santa that he will put an end to his blasphemy once and for all! Santa defends himself by saying that he brings happiness and love into the world. Santa then challenges Jesus to a fight and tells him there can only be ‘one’. The fight starts off with Santa raising Jesus above his head and tossing him twenty feet across the snow. Stan and Kyle shout “Go Santa”! Jesus in return conjures a fireball and blasts it straight at Santa (in the of Goku from Dragonball Z) with Santa barely dodging the attack but the fireball continues on it’s course of destruction and blows up the ‘Santa stall’ which then crushes three children waiting to tell Santa what they want for Christmas. Santa fights back with a Dragonball Z move of his own which misses Jesus but it cuts Kenny’s head off which hits a broken statue and kills three more children. Stan says “Oh my God they killed Kenny”. Santa and Jesus continue to fight and both of them ask the kids to help finish off one another. This time everyone present at the fight starts arguing with each other. Stan interrupts everyone and asks “What would Brian Boitano do?”

Out of nowhere Brian Boitano makes an entrance on skates and asks “Did someone say my name?” The kids then ask him who he would help in a fight Jesus or Santa Claus. Brian Boitano reply’s by telling them “Kids you shouldn’t be thinking about thing like that, this is the one time of year when we all try to get along, no matter what we believe in. This is the season to be good to each other. Bye!” Brian Boitano swiftly makes his way else where. Santa and Jesus start fighting again much to the dislike of Stan and Kyle who then try to explain to Jesus that Santa is keeping the spirit of his birthday alive by bringing happiness and joy and they tell Santa that if it wasn’t for Jesus Christmas would not exist. Santa and Jesus settled there differences and Jesus offers to buy Santa an orange smoothie which he gratefully accepts. Stan, Kyle and Cartman look back on what just happened and Stan says “Wow we just meet Brian Boitano but more importantly we learned something today that it doesn’t matter if your Christian or Jewish or Atheist or Hindu, Christmas is still about one very important thing” Cartman interrupts and says “Ya, ham”! Stan starts calling Cartman inappropriate names. Stan continues “Christmas is about something more important, presents.” Kyle then tells Stan that if you’re Jewish you get presents for eight days. Stan and Cartman are surprised and tell Kyle that there going to be Jewish as well. The three kids start walking down the street while singing “The Dreidel Song.”