o. 370
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
FROM: Washington July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 558.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Re your # 335 [a].
I have conferred with our navy experts in regard to the technical points involved, and as a result our opinions, on the points you asked about, are as follows:
(1) This would be possible.
(2) and (3) While it would likely be possible to send communications as “amateurs”, with the highly developed detector equipment in use here, it would be impossible to keep secret the existence and use of such a radio set in the Embassy compound. This would be especially true whenever the situation should become worse, and with interference to be encountered in wave lengths, there would be little hope of our being able to make any efficient use of such means, and looked at from the situation as a whole we think it would be inadvisable to try it.
[a] Tokyo questions Washington on the possibility of setting up a wireless set at the Ambassador’s office as a precaution against developments leading to limitations to or possible prohibition of, the use of radio. July 7, 1941; II, 361.
Trans. 7‑26‑41
No. 371
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 337.
Re your circular # 1013 [a].
Secret outside the Department.
In our present telegraphic room we have no space for the equipment, so we shall have to revise and expand it in order to accommodate the equipment. The best place to land this would be in Baltimore. I can send a member of my staff there and I am sure we can get it to Washington without any trouble. As soon as I arrive at an estimate of the expenses for this rebuilding and expansion, I will let you know.
[a] Tokyo says it would like to ship a special size safe to maintain custody of code machines and code books, and asks for immediate information as to place of installation, whether or not it will be difficult to bring in, and where it should be unloaded.
Trans. 5‑29‑41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 372
FROM: Washington May 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 339.
From New York as follows:
Re your Circular to America # 1013 [a].
As you wrote in your letter, the present office is too small and unless we rent other quarters there will be no room to install a safe. Also, we wish to get a place rather removed from the present office. Even if, for example, we enforce our night watch as at present, (as you are well aware, the matter of the night watch is illegal and very inconvenient), it is extremely difficult to maintain adequate protection for our secret codes. Furthermore, Hirasawa has informed us that unless we have a separate house it will not be possible to install a code machine. He has also communicated this to the head office. Our lease on the present office expires in September of this year. We wish to move to a place that will be suitable for the telegraphic office also, and there install all the equipment we need. This will also be the best place to install the safe to which you refer.
We have made tentative arrangements for moving to a suitable location in October of this year with rent about the same as here and only await your approval. However, the landlord must have definite word by June 1st, so please wire approval immediately.
In regard to the expenses connected with the move, maintaining a separate office and an apartment will necessitate more employees. This, together with the heating and various other commodities involved, will mean that our operating expenses will be several times what they are at present. Conditions being what they are, I again ask permission to make this move.
[a] Matsuoka wires Washington he is sending a safe for maintaining custody of code machines and books. Wants to know where it will be installed and where it shall be unloaded.
Trans. 6‑5‑41
No. 373
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 2, 1941
TO: Rome, Washington, Berlin, Moscow, Berne and Rio Circular # 1166.
(Urgent)
(3 parts‑complete) (Washington Circular # 126)
In various countries the science of cryptography and cryptanalysis is being practiced more and more. To tell the truth, no absolute confidence can be placed in the secrecy of a code. We, ourselves, in this office are worrying about drawing up a set of new codes, so we would like for you to give us some suggestions from time to time as to suitable procedures. Please pay the strictest attention always during the transfer and tenure of codes and heed the following points on the maintenance of the security of codes, independent of reliance on safes alone.
1. Needless to say, courier mail is a more secure method of transmitting information than by reliance upon codes, so when there is some secret matter which might arouse a given nation, please send the message by courier mail or some other method equally as safe.
2. I am having an official in charge of this work keep the various offices informed. Each time you get a list, keep one copy of it only and burn the preceding list immediately.
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3. Hereafter, as a matter of principle, code messages in ‑‑‑‑- are not to be sent anywhere except to this office. As a matter of fact, all other code messages, except those to this office, save in cases of necessity, are to be stopped.
Please see to it that there is no misunderstanding to the effect that after abolishing this sort of dispatches it is not our intention to increase the difficulties of those in charge of telegraphic work through the necessity of safeguarding dispatches, or the sudden complication of our codes, but that I am merely trying to make our dispatches in general more safe and facile.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 375
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 2, 1941
TO: Rome, Vichy, Moscow, Berne, Berlin, Bangkok, Washington, Circular # 1167.
Singapore, and Batavia
As stated in circular # 1166 [a] from the Foreign Minister, the strictest care is necessary for the protection of the secrecy of codes. Well, our telegraphic staffs are already busy without the aforementioned innovations, and this is but another added burden, so please have them cut down dispatches to the absolute minimum.
[a] See II. 373.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 376
FROM: Washington July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo
Message # 268 from New York to Tokyo.
The duties of telegraphic clerk for this office are being handled by Watanabe alone and up to now he has been able to accomplish the work by being very faithful in the discharge of his duties. But in view of the present increase in the number of telegrams which must be handled through this office for the various departments, as for instance the instruction regarding shipping and the more important telegrams concerning commercial firms, banks, and intelligence agents, and the necessity of maintaining secrecy, it will be necessary immediately to have some one sent here temporarily at least from the nearest office. At the same time we wish to request that you give immediate consideration to the matter of increasing the clerical staff here and wire us immediately as to what action you have taken. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
We are well aware of the shortage of help that exists all along the line. All of the staff here are doing their best to help out in the telegraphic department. However, the complexity of the telegraphic art of the present day does not lend itself very well to part time work. (Our three clerks here all hold additional posts. One is engaged in correspondence, another in accounting, and the other in commerce.) Due to the pressure of business it is very difficult to handle the telegraphic code. Please give this matter consideration.
Trans. 7‑9‑41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 377
FROM: Washington July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 554.
(Part 1 of 3)
# 340 from New York to the Foreign Minister.
(Strictly Secret.)
Re message # 339 [a] from the United States to the Foreign Minister.
Though we are now searching for a separate building, we have not been able to find one, and in the meantime, time is awasting, and there is the matter of instructions received from you on successive occasions with regard to the emergency situation. Under the present situation, in order that we might prepare ourselves for more critical developments, we feel it advisable to make the best use of the facilities at hand. Therefore, for the time being at least, we have given up the proposal of attempting to find a satisfactory building of our own. We would like at this time to effect an expansion of our business office and to acquire the necessary equipment for such an expansion, in addition to which we feel that the equipping of our telegraphic and document rooms as well as a night duty room is of the utmost importance. In order that we may immediately realize these things for the time being we feel we must at least rent additional office space immediately and along the following lines:
1. The business offices of the Consul-Generalcy at the present time are more than overcrowded. We have been forced to use the two old ordinary reception rooms to serve also as document and night rooms. When we are anxious to use the reception room for the entertainment of a caller, we find it most inconvenient to carry on anything like a secret conversation. In order that we may use the reception room as it was originally intended, it is going to be absolutely necessary that we rent another room.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 8‑9‑41
No. 378
FROM: Washington July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 554.
(Part 2 of 3. )
2. After hours, in order to maintain a watch for the purpose of the preservation of our secrets, we have had a member of the staff on night duty since August of last year. Because there is no suitable room in the office which can be assigned to such a purpose, we have been forced to use a studio couch in the reception room as a bed for this member of the staff. In spite of the fact that this duty works a considerable hardship upon the staff member from the point of view of health, should the situation here become more critical, there would be no recourse for us but to assign two men to this duty, but with the present facilities this is impossible. Now there are building regulations having to do with night duty in the office, but we have come to an understanding with the owners by saying we are working twenty‑four hours per day. How ever, having reached that understanding, it is most inconvenient for the man on duty to have
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to go to the bathroom in his night clothes. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary, if we are going to do a satisfactory job in the operation of this night duty, we will have to rent a room which at least has a minimum of conveniences.
3. The room which we are now using for telegraphic operations is exceedingly small. There is no room for two to be on duty at the same time. Therefore, we would like to have you consider expanding this office so that we may take care of special safes and increase in the personnel (please refer to my # 368 [a]) which we hope to have in the future.
[a] In which NOMURA advises Tokyo that the New York Times stated that Japan has been considering a neutrality pact with the United States and that he, NOMURA, had advised the U.S. Government to do the proper thing about the article.
Trans. 8‑9‑41
No. 379
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 554.
(Part 3 of 3)
Last summer it was necessary to change the reception room into a document room. This room we are now using for the custody of important documents, the classification of documents, the operation of Japanese type mimeograph machines, and for the collection and disposition of documents. Not only is it impossible to use this room as a reception room, but for purposes of document collection and disposition it is much too cramped. Should you give your permission to the increasing of our staff of Japanese typists by one person, it is a fact that there would be no room for the machine he or she would use. Therefore, at this time, it is of utmost necessity that we increase our floor space to take care of one room to be used for document collection and disposition. With regard to the above, a total increase of appropriation would be required in the amount of $3,700.00, and the equipment fund would require an increase of $1,093.00. (Blue prints and estimates on the cost of equipment we are sending you by air mail.)
Though this increased appropriation seems very high, it can’t be helped. On the one hand, in order that we might continue renting the present official residence as it stands, we have finally secured a reduction of $1,000.00 in our annual rental as a result of our determined negotiations with the owners. After you have considered that a deduction of this amount from the increased appropriation requested a balance of $2,700.00 remains to be appropriated, please be so kind as to sanction this increased allotment immediately. Furthermore, in these times it would seem that should the vacant room immediately adjoining this office be rented by an American, it might be most embarrassing from the point of view of the maintenance of our secrets. Therefore, please consider this fact as well as the others mentioned.
Trans. 8‑9‑41
A-190
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 380
FROM: New York (Morishima) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 371.
Lately our telegraphic duties have been gradually increasing. Telegrams from the Finance Office and other governmental messages as well as request messages from merchants and banks have been piling up. Dispatches which require immediate attention have grown rapidly in number. Therefore, I placed another member of my staff with Mr. WATANABE, who is in charge of such business, and had Secretary KIHARA come to our assistance from ‑‑‑‑and Secretary KAJIHARA come up from Washington. They are pressed in Washington also, and for technical reasons KAJIHARA cannot be spared long, and I shall have to send him back to Washington this week. Our telegraphic section must have help, however, so I have asked Washington to send us an aide from the Embassy. Please order them to choose a man with experience in urgent telegrams and send him up here immediately.
Trans. 10‑10‑41
No. 381
FROM: Washington July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 601.
There is a request from the Military and Naval Attachés that due to the situation prevailing at the present time they be permitted to move their office to the Embassy, for a time at least.
I recognize this as a reasonable request and will make the necessary arrangements for room. Please grant the request.
Trans. 8‑1‑41
No. 382
FROM: Washington July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 596.
From Chicago as follows:
Re your Circular # 1366 [a].
After consultation with the Embassy it has been decided to entrust the Imperial Portrait to the Embassy.
[a] To forestall the possibility of their offices in foreign countries being closed without warning, by the countries involved, Matsuoka issues instructions that precautions shall be taken for the safety of the Emperor’s portrait and, at the opportune time, the destruction of codes and official documents.
Trans. 8‑1‑41
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No. 383
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 615.
Reference your # 3 0.
The imperial portraits at New York and Chicago are en route to Washington. Student clerk HASHIZUME will leave by train on the 30th for San Francisco where he will place the portraits on the Asama Maru. Minister WAKASUGI will take over the pictures on board and will return them to the home office.
Trans. 8‑2‑41
No. 384
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 2, 1941
TO: Mexico # 93.
We have appropriated 100,000 yen for your intelligence and enlightenment expenses during the current fiscal year, and I am hereby sending you the first installment of 25,000 yen. This money is to be used as follows:
1. If worse comes to worst, we consider Mexico City, along with Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago as most important bases for intelligence concerning the United States. From a geographical standpoint it is most natural that we should endeavor to set up in Mexico City an establishment where we can carry on routine business in the matter of collecting intelligence concerning the United States. This point I stressed particularly in the outline in the first paragraph of my secret —– # 62 [a] with reference to propaganda activities.
2. Though the funds are in the main to be used in intelligence concerning the United States, what is left should be used in gathering intelligence in Mexico. Bear in mind that in putting this policy into effect our principal aim is to collect every possible bit of intelligence concerning the United States and, with this in view, I want you to contact and work out a cooperative policy with our officials in Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans and New York. Furthermore, in this connection, Mexicali might well be used.
3. Please also plan to use RAFAEL MUNAS for purposes of interception.
4. Concerning propaganda and enlightenment, in case the United States joins the war, we will endeavor to use our nationals there to our best possible advantage and we will do our very best to use Rightist and Leftist Labor organizations and promote their anti‑American revolutionary influence. Please use your best efforts to achieve this.
Secret outside the Department.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 7‑1‑41
A-192
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 385
FROM: Mexico City (Sato) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 206.
I wish to send JOSE LLERGO.
This man is thirty years old, youthful and energetic, and is already an influential reporter. His elder brother is the editor of the weekly periodical HOY. Although it seems to me that by and large Mexican newspapers are following the tendency of yielding to pressure from the United States, nevertheless HOY has steadily maintained unbiased editorials. I believe that through this man we can greatly influence the press of this country and that it would be much to our advantage to use him in the future.
I would like to send him by the next plane, so will you please remit his traveling expenses?
Trans. 7‑3‑41
No. 386
FROM: Mexico July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 280.
Re my # 206 [a].
1. On the 18th, PAPESU came to call on me to bid me farewell. On this occasion, he brought a man by the name of ISAKU DEIYASU (Isaac Diaz ?) (he is also a reporter on the OI (?), and is said to be PAPESU’s best friend). Since touring Europe, Diaz also has become very desirous of traveling to Japan. So, seizing upon PAPESU’s visit to Japan, he has decided to go there too, at his own expense.
Some time ago, I had members of my staff make investigations into the characters of these men. This was the first time, however, that I met and talked with Diaz, and was happy to find that both men were exceedingly pleasant.
They are both underlings of Maximino Camacho and are well qualified for future utilization by us. I was firmly convinced that it would be to our interest to have both men travel to Japan. I, therefore, told Diaz that because there was no time to advise my home government of his coming, I could not say definitely whether he could be given any financial assistance or not. However, I would do my best for him, I said; and told him to go to Japan on the assumption that he would have to pay his own way, (in part, at least).
Because of these circumstances, I would appreciate your giving consideration to allowing Diaz the same sort of treatment as has been extended to PAPESU.
[a] June 14, II, 385. Consul General Sato at Mexico City states his desire to send Jose Llergo, outstanding Mexican news reporter and brother of the Editor of Hoy, weekly periodical. Believes that the Mexican press can be greatly influenced through him.
Trans. 7‑23‑41
A-193
No. 387
FROM: Mexico (Miura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 222.
From Minister YAMAGATA (en route to Peru).
1. The question of Obtaining Military Materials.
Both the President and the Minister of Economics kept on running away from me; consequently, I was unable to have them allow me to confer with them. Both the German and Italian Ministers advised me against undertaking negotiations in any way conspicuous. Even if I opened the negotiations by bringing up first of all the question of rayon and proposed either a barter system or compensatory trade, there is very little likelihood of my succeeding by approaching the question through the front door. There is no way but to approach it from the back door. At any rate, it is a question whether I would succeed in this matter, inasmuch as additional pressure is being exerted at present by the United States. Mexican business men in this field expect that sooner or later an embargo or export license system would be put into effect affecting the export to Japan of mercury and other materials. Under these circumstances, I think it is very important for us to make purchases now in as large quantities and in as secret a manner as possible.
2. As regards political trends in this part of the world, I will wire you information after my arrival in Panama since trends in the Caribbean and Central American countries must also be taken into consideration.
Trans. 7‑1‑41
No. 388
FROM: Tokyo June 20, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 105.
Re your # 208 [a].
1. In reference to the purchase of exports referred to previously, a high price was offered for 15,000 boxes (bales, crates ?). Following up the idea of your suggestion, 7,500 boxes were finally agreed upon. The price was lowered from $83.00 for 120 denier to $81.00 for 150 denier.
2. In order that outsiders may be kept from getting in on this export purchase, it will be necessary for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to give out a warning within the near future.
3. Please continue endeavoring to obtain a barter of artificial silk for mercury. In addition, try to obtain assurance of general essential materials by offering the Mexicans any sort of stipulations desired, such as offering to make a deposit of guarantee. Also, it is desired to make barter arrangements for necessary industrial materials. Please answer by wire, giving your opinion about this.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 6‑23‑41
A-194
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 389
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 12, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 96.
To Minister YAMAGATA.
In view of the fact that there are at present certain delicate trends in Columbia, on your way to Peru will you please stop for one week at Bogota.
Trans. 7‑1‑41
No. 390
FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 60.
According to your message # 96 [a] to our Minister in Mexico, Minister YAMAGATA [b] is soon to visit me. Both from a geographical and a business point of view, our petroleum interests in Mexico are being curtailed. Consequently, I feel that it is necessary to have official NAGUMO [c], who is stationed in Quito, come here and sit with me while we discuss this matter with Minister YAMAGATA. Therefore, will you please arrange to have NAGUMO come here after visiting Lima? I have discussed this with NAGUMO.
[a] See II, 389.
[b] Kiyoshi Yamagata has held important positions in Venezuela, Foreign Office, in Tokyo, and in legations at London, Washington, and Brussels, accompanied by Secretary Takagi.
[c] Consul in Quito, Ecuador.
Trans. 6‑25‑41
No. 391
FROM: Mexico (Miura) June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 224.
(In 2 parts‑complete.)
Relative to getting this office organized on a war time basis, I explained all the circumstances within the office to Minister Yamagata and discussed plans with him thoroughly. As a result we have concluded that the following measure would be most desirable and therefore, we would like to request your cooperation in bringing them about at the earliest possible time:
(1) We (have been expecting ?) the arrival of Secretary Fujii and he seems to have arrived in Spain (?) but we have already received a dispatch from him saying “I have been trying to secure steamer accommodation, but under present conditions there is little prospect. The Foreign Office understands this and therefore, you will please be advised accordingly.” Now, with the outbreak of the German‑Soviet hostilities it will be still more difficult for him to come, and therefore, we would request that some other person be appointed and sent forward at once.
(2) As mentioned in my # 134 [a], we have here greatly desired (closer contacts with ?) those connected with trade relations, financial matters and the intelligence work, and if there are
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difficulties in the way of getting these hooked up together at this time, why not appoint someone now who as the above mentioned first secretary could have general charge over the business in the office, and in addition also have the responsibility of either the trade or the intelligence work. If this could be done, then we could have Secretary Sato look after the other duties. Or in case no suitable person can be found of the First Secretary class, if we could have some young person with experience in either of these lines of work sent out immediately, we could put Sato in general charge of the office work and one of the other lines.
(3) Please appoint as capable a person as possible as Fukushima’s relief at once.
(4) Kataoka and Samijima are both competent men, but they have been here many years, and from the standpoint of bringing about a new atmosphere in this office we would like to have them transferred elsewhere and new men appointed in their places. In case it is impossible to have them transferred elsewhere, we would be pleased to have Kataoka appointed to Salvador and Samijima to Mexicali, and have Takashima and Miyazawa from those places, respectively, appointed to duty in this office.
(5) Then, although Kato of Mexicali does have a situation in his family, in view of the needs during this serious emergency, I wish his return home could be deferred a while longer and that he be instructed immediately to take up duties in this office, or else have orders issued for Kato of Argentina, who is said to be returning home soon, report for service here for the time being. In this latter instance, we would have no objections to Kato’s being ordered to duty elsewhere.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 7‑1‑41
No. 392
FROM: Mexico City July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 240.
Re my # 224 [a].
In view of the times and conditions, we do not believe that it would be to our interest to move Kato of Mexicali. Please, therefore, do not issue orders for him to return to Japan, but instead have him stay where he is for the present, and have Miyazawa come here and assume his post alone.
Will you please also consider ways and means of making use of Kato in the event that (the ?) Mexicali (office ?) is strengthened?
[a] See II, 391, Amb. Miura at Mexico City wires Tokyo of his plans, after conference with Minister Yamagata, for organizing the Mexico City office on a war time basis. Suggests several changes of personnel at the office and requests that someone be sent there to substitute for Secy. Fujii who is in Spain and unable to leave because of lack of steamer accommodations.
Trans. 7‑7‑41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 393
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 236.
Re paragraph # 2 of your # 111 [a] .
1. KATO, of Mexicali, spoke to the following effect to Emissary YAMAGATA and to the members of this office when he visited this office recently for the purpose of business (I was at that time visiting the other country to which I have been accredited).
He said: “In Mexicali and vicinity American influence is predominant (All officials from the Governor down are puppets of the United States). Although there are many Japanese inhabitants there, since not one of them belongs to the intelligentsia, if intelligence work is to be carried on, it is absolutely necessary that both funds and the personnel be reorganized at the branch.”
2. I believe he is right. Although it is difficult to conduct intelligence work, which is liable to be noticeable, in a border city having a population, according to recent figures, of 15,000, I believe the work there would prove useful, provided that the intelligence net in Los Angeles and vicinity is well organized, especially if a situation occurs in which we find it necessary to withdraw our officials now in the United States. Now, if this is so, I believe we should at once establish connection with Los Angeles and make necessary preparations.
[a] See II, 398‑Tokyo asks Mexico to reply as soon as possible regarding the plan to contact and work out a cooperative policy with officials in Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, and New York in an effort to collect every possible bit of intelligence concerning the United States.
Trans. 7‑7‑41
No. 394
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 232.
Re my # 229 [a].
1. With regard to the AP dispatch referred to in the above mentioned message, the Foreign Office issued a statement on the 27th, the gist of which was as follows:
The aims of an agreement of this nature between the governments of these two countries are, as outlined in the statement published on 8 June (refer to my message # 204 [b]) to mutually supply each other with materials needed under the present world conditions. The text of the agreement can, undoubtedly, be made public shortly.
2. We have been continuing to work on the matter contained in paragraph 2 of my message # 208 [c]. Since we have been able to establish connections with Maximino Camacho recently, (we shall be able to make a detailed report shortly), we postponed making the demands contained in your message # 134 [d] for the time being. However, in view of the manner in which the above statement was made, we now believe that it would be well to discuss the matter openly with the Foreign Minister. We are at present making arrangements to do so.
[a] Not available.
[b] A negotiation is underway between officials of America and Mexico which proposes to institute an agreement between the two countries to supply each other with needed commodities,” etc.
[c] Not available.
[d] Not available. Probably a garbled number.
Trans. 7‑7‑41
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No. 395
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 220.
We have studied the situation here with reference to the matter of Japanese ships fishing in Mexican waters and are agreed that for the time being there is nothing for us to worry about and that we should merely watch coolly the course of events. A Naval message of the 20th will give you the details. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
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