Archive for April, 2009

Prime Minister PABERATTI, Foreign Minister RORUKOBITTI 0.fm.pm.449 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 26, 2009

No. 928
October 16, 1941 http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us
#706.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

(Part 1 of 2.)

Part 1 of #1200(?) addressed to the Minister from our Ambassador in Soviet Russia.

Newspapers in this country have not, until today, mentioned a word about the German general offensive. Since the first of the month compulsory military training, mentioned in my #1155[a], has been carried on.

On the 3rd, not only those born in 1922 but all of those who had previously been deferred were enlisted and on the 5th, the authorities in charge of primary schools ordered the parents of children under 12 years of age to remove the children to Chelyabinsk[b]. (There have been a

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

considerable number who had evacuated in the middle of July but who have returned to the city later.) (It seems that few are responding to this order.)

On the 6th,—–system was put into effect for milk for infants and for eggs and cream. On

the other hand, fortifications are being built in the suburbs giving one a sense of the impending crisis.

On the 8th, the newspapers all of a sudden announced that severe fighting was going on at Vyazma (243 kilometers from this city by rail) and at Bryansk (272 kilometers from this city).

[a] Not available.
[b] City, SW Ural area in Soviet Russia.

Trans. 10-21-41


No. 929
October 6, 1941
#706.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

(Part 2 of 2.)

Today, the 9th, the desertion of OREL (?) (387 kilometers from this city) was announced. That this news was a severe shock to the people in general is unmistakably evident. Both the “Pravda” and the “Isvestia” printed tragic editorials on the 9th, strongly emphasizing the fact that the present war is a struggle as a result of which they would either overthrow Facism or become its slaves; that if they do not wish to lose the war and become victims of German aggression, they can do no other than fight to the finish; and, therefore, the people should unite as one body and strive to overcome the crisis. However, this editorial has no appeal to the people at large, for, among other reasons, they are resentful towards the government leaders who have kept themselves shut in the Kremlin and have brought about this defeat. It seems that anxiety and restlessness are growing more than ever among the people.

Trans. 10-21-41


No. 930
October 17, 1941
#290.
FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
TO: Santiago, Buenos Aires, Quito, Lima, La Paz Cir.

(Received from Tokyo as Circular #2149.)

Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow and most of his staff evacuated Moscow on the 16th, leaving only a few staff members, together with the diplomatic corps. Their destination is not definitely known yet. Send no code messages to that office.

Trans. 10-21-41


No. 931
August 6, 1941
#516.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

Since the occupation of French Indo-China, the activities of the empire have attracted the general concern of this country. All papers carried news of this activity and gave it preemin-

[A-469]

ence, especially insofar as it applied to the press campaigns of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet, and emphasized the strength and arms of Japanese Empire. This state of affairs, as you are aware, I told you repeatedly in my wires and special communications. The expectation is strong that Japan will take new and direct measures. This trend is being correlated with British and American propaganda in regard to rumors of a compromise with the United States and the weakness of Japan’s economic condition. Officially they are controlling rumors of an estrangement between Japan and the Axis.

All the newspapers in this city have been editorializing at length contradicting the apparent strength of England and the United States by saying that under the surface they are taking pacific measures and have no intention of arousing Japan suddenly. They hope to do this gradually. Should Japan take the initiative and exert her full might, Britain and America’s pressure upon Japan would be no problem at all. Being by very nature impulsive, they are impatient for Japan to come out and take the offensive against England and the United States suddenly from the dark.

In addition, they say that should the United States effect assistance to the Soviet by way of Siberia, they would force Japan into a war against the Soviet. It would seem through their editorial comment, that all people here are impatient in their hopes of the current situation revolving into a general war against the Soviet. On the other hand, they are impetuously wishful in their desires for another strong hand in this fight and hope that Japan will take the initiative.

Relayed to Berlin.

Trans. 8-8-41


No. 932
August 18, 1941
#526.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

According to a spy report, HITLER and MUSSOLINI will meet somewhere in South Russia in the near future. If this is true, it is to be construed as a counter-action to the recent meeting of ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL on the sea.

Relayed to Berlin.

Trans. 8-20-41


No. 933
August 22, 1941
#540.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

During a broadcast of general news on the 12th, it was reported as special news of that day from Shanghai that negotiations for the final draft of a treaty of mutual aid had been completed between Soviet Russia and the CHIANG regime. Now if this is true, I believe we could use it as an effective warning in our propaganda by accusing Soviet Russia as thereby having violated the Japan-Soviet Russia neutrality agreement. Will you please wire me for my information the truth of the matter.

Trans. 8-26-41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 934
August 27, 1941
#234. http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rome

Re your #540[a].

The above was a newspaper report and its veracity is being investigated at present. There is also the relation mentioned in paragraph 8 of my Circular #1587[b]. However, at present the authorities are not making use of this propaganda material.

[a] See III, 933.
[b] Worldwide propaganda campaign will be initiated along with occupation of French Indo-China.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 935
August 28, 1941
#550.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 3.)

Re my #514[a].

The party of Japanese newspapermen who were on their way to Croatia (Kanakura, a semi-official attached to this office, accompanied them) left here on the 9th and was warmly welcomed at many places. They had an opportunity to interview Prime Minister PABERATTI[b], Foreign Minister RORUKOBITTI[b], and other important personages and then returned on the 25th. Their report of their trip was roughly as follows:

1. Peace and order in the country is gradually being restored under the leadership of PABERATTUTI[b] who is backed by the UUSUTASRA[b] (which corresponds to the Fascist Party). Although the influence of the MACHEKKU[c] faction is still strong among the peasants, MA is on good terms with PA (on the 10th the MACHEKKU[c] faction (peasant party) members united the UUSUTASHA[b]) and is now giving increasing cooperation to win them over, the Mohammedans around Saraebo are more and more acting in unison with this party. Strict vigilence is being exercised as ever over the action of the Serbians (about 1,000,000); however, about two months ago an agreement was made with Germany to exchange about half of this number of Serbians with the Slovenes in the Serbian territory and this agreement is already being put into effect.

2. The country is rich in such resources as forestry, live stock, agriculture, mining, etc., and the Government has appropriated 4,000,000 naaru for public work and 2,600,000,000 for agricultural reconstruction. Thus, the Government is endeavoring to develop natural resources and build up the country. The cities were found to be clean and the cultural level of the people fairly high. Their self-confidence is so strong as to amount to being faith.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Matchek.

Trans. 0-00-00

[A-471]


No. 936
August 28, 1941
#550.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 3.)

3. Antagonism which the people harbor against Italy is beyond one’s imagination. They resent strongly Italy’s attitude in presenting them with exorbitant demands regardless of the fact that Italy had not given Croatia any military assistance to enable her to achieve her independence, and in treating the country as if it were a more vassal state; nor do they find any good reason for Italy’s taking possession of Dalmatia, which is a region hardly Italian in any respect. In fact, some Croats go so far as to demand the return of the lost territories of Fiume[a] and Zara[b].

4. At the beginning when PABERITTUTI assumed his post, Italy’s demand was for the cession of the entire region east of the line extending from Ogulin to Mosutaaru[d]. However, the Croatian Government having refused to comply with this demand, a compromise was finally made with the—–of the harbor of Supretto[e] as the line. More recently Italy demanded the right of political control over the region extending from Kaarobattu[f] to Sosutaaru[g] and submitted an ultimatum giving 11:00 p.m. of the 17th of this month as the hour for reply and thus forced them to grant her the right to place the coastal region on the Adriatic Sea under the control of the Commander in Chief of the Italian forces in that region.

On repeated occasions the Croatian authorities appealed to Germany with regard to the Italian pressure. However, it is said that Germany is allowing the matter to remain fuming, saying that Croatia should wait until the Russo-German war is over.

Furthermore, between Italy and Croatia are various pending questions, such as the question of marking the national boundary and the question of trade. Italy has early sent representatives to Croatia to discuss these questions, but the Croatians are resorting to delaying contacts. It is said that this attitude is due to German advice.

[a] Prov. Venezia Giuliae Zara Dept. Italy.
[b] Prov. Venezia Giuliae Zara Dept. Italy on Dalmation Coast.
[c] Comm., Sava Co., Yugoslavia.
[d] Mostar, Comm. S.E. Primorjo Co., Yugoslavia, on Narenta River.
[e] Spalato (also spelled “Split”) seaport city, capital of Primorjo Co.,
[f] Karlovac—Comm. W. Con. Sava Co., Yugoslavia.
[g] Probably Susak, seaport, Comm. W. Sava Co., Yugoslavia.

Trans. 0-00-00


No. 937
August 28, 1941
#550.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 3.)

5. The German forces are encamped mainly on the side facing Hungary from the line extending between Zagaburia[a] (approximately 10,000) and Saraebo[b] (approximately 9,000). The Italian forces are encamped along the region extending toward the Adriatic Sea on one side of the line extending from a point about 15 kilometers south of Zagaburia[a] to Mosuuru[c]. They have roughly 6,000 to 7,000 in Raguza[d] and 10,000 in Supakaato[c]. The standard of the Italian forces is far below that of the German forces, and this has contributed to the Croatians’ contempt

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

of Italy. At the time of the recent outbreak of a rebellion in Montenegro, the Italian forces were encircled at Bokka-de-kataro[f] and at other points, and it is said that the Italian Minister in Zagaburia[a] had to appeal to Croatia for aid.

6. The general feeling toward Germany is excellent. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  The people tend to depend on Germany as the only country which could restrain Italy. The Croats have recognized by a broad interpretation of Croatian laws, the autonomy of some 150,000 Germans residing in the country and have gone so far as to permit these Germans to form a citizens’ army. The boundary line between Serbia, now under German occupation, and Croatia has already been fixed, with the river Dorina as the border, in an agreement between Germany and Croatia.

7. The incident of Hungary’s taking advantage of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and occupying the oil regions of Muru[g] has caused considerable indignation on the part of the Croats, who regard it as a second Fiume incident. Naturally their feelings toward Hungary are very bad. This is why they have listed the Hungarians along with the Slovakians and Italians on the top of their listing of enemy countries.

8. They are now using some 60,000 men, including the Army, Navy and air forces in the Russo-German war. The Navy, displaying the Croatian flag on three German warships, is taking an active part in the Black Sea.

[a] Zagreb.
[b] Serajevo.
[c] Kana spelling.
[d] Ragusa, a seaport W. Zeta Co. Yugoslavia.
[e] Spalato or Split.
[f] Probably Boka Kotoraka.
[g] Mur(?).

Trans. 9-2-41


No. 938
August 30, 1941
#556.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #512[a]. Strictly secret.

1. I have since been watching the attitude of the Japanese Government as it appeared to me here, and have received the impression that Japan is endeavoring principally to restrain Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia and has neither the intention nor the power to break immediately the encirclement of Japan by these countries. If preparations in Japan have been completed to carry out her magnificent policy, it is a matter of congratulations. However, if on the contrary, preparations are not being carried out as intended, a war of nerves based principally on restraining other countries serves to sharpen the attitude of vigilance on the part of those countries, as well as to strengthen their counter policy. It would help only to hasten their preparations against us and in turn cause us to pay a greater sacrifice when the time comes for us to take up arms as a last resort in order to break the encirclement. Furthermore, if, as a result, the war becomes an indecisive one, it cannot be said that there is no danger of our being obliged to engage in a lengthy struggle which would be unprofitable to us.

[A-473]

2. Of course it is clear that in breaking this encirclement and pressure against Japan there are methods varying in their degree of urgency and difficulty. We should select the method most in accord with our national strength and the development of the international situation; but to carry out boldly at this time our policy of southward advance and to invade Thailand with our armies—this is absolutely essential;

[a] See II, 679-681.

Trans. 00-00-00


No. 939
August 30, 1941
#556.
FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 2.)

for, today when Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia have not yet fully joined hands, this action will not lead to a clash with Great Britain and the United States. I believe it is becoming increasingly imperative that from this point we quickly demolish this front in the east and then deal with Great Britain and the United States.

Although Germany’s war against Soviet Russia may not progress in the manner anticipated by Germany, Germany will probably, generally speaking, succeed in occupying the most important sections of European Russia within the next two months or so. I believe that Japan’s attitude will have a great deal of influence upon enabling Germany to concentrate her power in attacking Britain. It goes without saying that should Germany concentrate her attention to attacking Britain, British forces in the south will be greatly increased.

3. If it is that Japan can complete her work of establishing a new order in the greater East Asia and maintain at the same time her security merely by a policy of restraining other countries, it might be well. However, if in the meantime the British and American encirclement of the European Continent gains in strength, and Germany’s offensive power against England weakens, and in turn United States pressure on Japan increases, Japan will have to face what she fears most; namely, lack of petroleum and other necessary materials and she, in utter desperation, will have to fight. This would be a serious thing for Japan, indeed.

Trans. 9-4-41

without any justifiable reason 2.wit.000100 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 5, 2009

No. 171 September 12, 1941 #816. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo The speech which ROOSEVELT delivered on the 11th was given in a grave tone of voice and without using any strong expressions; it was, in other words, comparable to a clenched fist clothed in a silk glove. In content it was a strong speech, amounting actually to a challenge to war on the seas (in the air, on and in the water). As to detailed information concerning the relations to this speech, please refer to our special report. Judging from the fact that various newspapers are on the whole in favor of ROOSEVELT, it may be said that he has succeeded in accomplishing what he intended to accomplish. Furthermore, there are many factors driving the United States straightway into this war. One factor may be said to be the fact that due to circumstances resulting from great expansion of productive and economic organizations undertaken under the pretext of national defense ever since the opening of the war between Great Britain and Germany, these economic and productive organizations must of necessity disintegrate unless the United States joins the war.————————–since they do not agree on———-, such an incident as the Geer incident may be regarded as welcome to ROOSEVELT from the standpoint of quickly turning public opinion in his favor. Trans. 9-16-41 No. 172 September 12, 1941 #811. FROM: Washington (Nomura) TO: Tokyo Following ROOSEVELT’S speech on the evening of the 11th LINDBERGH spoke at a meeting of the America First Committee at Des Moines in Iowa saying that England, Jewry and the Roosevelt Administrators composed a three party alliance which was leading the United States into war. Trans. 9-17-41 No. 173 September 12, 1941 #1983/9. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington (Circular) (Part 1 of 2) 1. Taking together various information which I have recently collected from Chinese sources with regard to recent Japanese-American relations, I have the following: (1) Chungking is kept in constant anxiety about the United States’ policy because it is prosecuted on the basis of the United States’ interests alone and because it has had no effect as yet in strengthening Chinese power of resistance, and consequently Chungking cannot be sure whether preparations for the counter-offensive could be built up again. They regard also that the outcome of the current Japanese-American conversations depends upon how the Russo-German war will turn out, and even in case a compromise is arrived at by the United States and Japan, they think that there is little danger of it being made at the expense of [A-91] Chiang. http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us  However, actually the Chinese authorities are wondering what will happen. It is said that Chiang had Ambassador—–propose to the United States Government that in case the question of Japanese-Chinese peace comes up for discussion, the settlement would be made on the basis of President ROOSEVELT’s eight-point principles and that to this proposal HULL had replied that the United States would not sacrifice Chungking. (2) Among those in Chungking, there are many who say that should a war break out between Japan and the United States, it would be to China’s advantage. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   On the other hand, there are not a few who say that should such a war break out, it would prove unprofitable to Chungking, because the United States will have no time to pay any attention to Chungking, and because of stoppage of material aid, China would suffer a severe blow. Recently this question was debated in a conference held by Chungking leaders, but no definite conclusion resulted because these two different views remained irreconcilable. Trans. 9-15-41 No. 174 September 12, 1941 #1983/9. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington (Part 2 of 2) (3)  http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us   Recently an influential official engaged in special affairs duties for the Chungking Government let out his views to the effect that it would not be difficult for the United States to bring Japan to submission but that if, perchance, the United States should seek temporary stability at the cost of Chungking, Chungking will continue her anti-Japanese resistance unaided. SUN FO[a] entertains an even stronger view. However, such views held by important members of the Chungking regime are expressed in accordance with the propaganda order of that government and so cannot be regarded as being representative of the real psychology of that government. (4) To be sure, the Nanking Government also is interested in the possible development of Japanese-American relations. According to a report made by Ambassador HONDA, most of the important members of that government are of the opinion that since the United States has no intention of fighting against Japan, a war will not break out. Although, generally speaking, no serious consideration has yet been given to what the attitude of the government would be with regard to this question, the officials, greatly exaggerating the power of the United States, seem to think that in case a war breaks out, Japan’s defeat would be inevitable, and should this happen, since Japan will have no time to concern herself with the People’s Government, the foundation upon which the new government is being built will begin to shake, and maintenance of peace and order in the jurisdiction will become impossible. Being anxious, they seem to be very eager to see the war averted. [a] Member of the Central Executive Yuan. Trans. 9-15-41 [A-92] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR No. 175 September 13, 1941 #561. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington Re your #804[a]. On the 13th we made explanation to Ambassador Grew as per English text of my #562[a] and you will also give reply accordingly to the United States. [a] See III, 159-161. [b] See III, 176. Trans. 9-15-41 No. 176 September 13, 1941 #562. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington (In 5 parts—complete)[a] Chief of Office Routing Separate message Part 1 1. (a) The proposed draft of an understanding which has been constituting a basis for informal negotiations between Japanese and the United States Governments will continue to be a basis for further discussions. The points upon which we deem a tentative agreement had already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations in Washington comprise the preamble to the proposed understanding, the concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations, and the matter concerning the good offices of the United States to the relations between Japan and China. Although it seems that there is a misunderstanding on the part of the United States that Japan does not want good offices of the United States in the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government has by no means refused the good offices of the President of the United States and is still, as before, wishing for them. Part 2 (b) The term “without any justifiable reason” applies merely to the latter part of point “B” of the undertaking to which Japan is ready to commit itself. (c) For the purpose of preventing Communistic and other subversive activities threatening the safety of both Japan and China and also of maintaining the peace and order in China, Japan and China will cooperate in the form of common defense. The executive of the common defense by Japan and China will contain the stationing of Japanese troops for a certain period in accordance with the agreements between both countries. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   The Japanese troops which have been sent to China with the object of executing the China affairs will be withdrawn when the said affairs have been settled. (d) The reason why the Japanese Government inserted point (E) as a matter to—————(4 lines garbled———-wishes to show her intention of not obstructing any just and equitable economic activities of the United States in China. The government of Japan will not only admit the principle of non-discrimination with regard to commerce in China as well as in southwestern Pacific area, but also it fully respects the established rights and interests of the [A-93] United States in China. However, it considers that the especially close economic relations between Japan and China natural from their geographical propinquity are the same kind of relations as those which exist between any other two neighboring countries. Part 4 Indeed, there will be no reason why the principle of close economic relationship owing to the geographic propinquity shall not be applied to Japan’s economic relations with China. Accordingly the close and especial economic cooperation between Japan and China within this limit will not establish so-called monopolistic or preferential rights and interests for Japan. Moreover, it is firmly believed such is a natural phenomenon in our human life, and the observance of this new law of nature is not only a factor of bringing about economic prosperity of the world, but the surest way for the firm establishment of the world peace. Part 5 (e) Since matters relating to China, as has been stated above, are covered under point (d), the matter concerning Japanese economic activities in the southwestern Pacific area was clarified under point (e) in view of the fact that among other areas of the Pacific the United States is most concerned with the southwestern area of the Pacific. 2. The measures and actions referred to in point (a) among the proposed undertakings by the United States are meant to indicate acts of the United States in aid in various forms for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. As for the “good offices” of the President of the United States they were referred to above. [a] Part 3 not noted in original. Trans. 9-15-41 No. 177 September 13, 1941 #563. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington Re my #557[a]. During my conversation with Grew on the 13th, I explained the meaning of “equitable basis” as per my #564[b]. [a] See III, 148-153. [b] See III, 178. Trans. 9-15-41 [A-94] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR No. 178 September 13, 1941 #564. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington “Equitable basis” means economic activities of a non-discriminatory character which are not monopolistic, exclusive and exploitive, qualified however, by the inevitable natural limitations referred to in e of the reply to questions put by Mr. Hamilton under instructions of Mr. Hull on September 10. Accordingly it goes without saying that Japan is not the sole judge in determining what constitutes “equitable basis”. Trans. 9-15-41 No. 179 September 13, 1941 #560. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington (In 2 parts—complete) Re my #529[a]. (1) According to your #798[b], the contents of the main message have not yet been considered by the President, but the following points in my message have in reality been “covered” in the —–proposal that was conveyed to the United States from the Imperial Government: (a) Preliminary parleys have been included in our intentions. (b) But we wish to avoid having such parleys get into a discussion of minutiae and become long drawn out. (c) We would speed up the realization of a conference of the two leaders, (to try to go into a repetition of the reasons among the administrative officials would result in nothing taking shape, and we by all means feel the necessity of a statesman-like consultation between the two leaders). We made the one suggestion at that time that Japan and the United States should come to an agreement that would be reached from the standpoint of the whole situation. (In regard to this, the explanation you made to Hull, as given in your #788[c], very satisfactorily serves its purpose.) We therefore would have the contents of my reference message brought to the attention of the President himself with the request that he give some expression of his intentions.   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire    (2) That we are not—–with the kind of informal talks that Hull suggests, such as we have had thus far is evident from the messages that have been passing and from the whole situation, and it is clear from my reference message that this plan would enlarge the actual scope of the talks thus far held. While we are putting the stress on a settlement from the standpoint of the situation in its entirety, this would necessarily be based upon—–. We would like to see a conference of the two leaders brought about soon with my reference message as the basis of these conversations, and reducing business and legal discussions to a minimum. Then later the negotiations now being carried on may be resumed as may be necessary. (3) The United States seem to be asking us to recognize their so-called four principles, but we could not gulp those down as a whole, without having had their reply to the above mentioned reference message.—–would give the impression that it was due to “pressure” from the United States. http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us  The attitude of the United States that they must consult Britain, the Netherlands, China, and other nations, might be interpreted to mean the revival of the nine-power treaty policies, which would hardly be appropriate now. It is very important that we keep it in form and fact a parley between Japan and the United States. Please bear in mind the importance of this point. (Even though as a matter of fact the United States should confer with Brit- [A-95] ain, the Netherlands, etc. we are not in a position to prevent this, and in fact it could not be prevented, but this is something of which we would not be cognizant; but what we mean is that we would avoid having this lead into a conference or an agreement of many countries.) (4) This does not mean that we reject such questions as contained in your #814[d] and my #557[e] but the emphasis would be upon the points in my reference message, and our answer to these two messages will be sent shortly. [a] See III, 122-124. [b] See III, 157. [c] See III, 131-134. [d] Not available. [e] See III, 148-153. Trans. 9-15-41 No. 180 September 15, 1941 #819. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo (In 3 parts—complete) Re your 561 to 563[a]. Points that have occurred to us here: (1) Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as “two in one”. (2) The expression “Communistic and other subversive activity” would arouse their caution, and the words “common defense in China” would give rise to questions, while “agreement” would still leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms. (3) The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms. (4) In view of the national characteristics of the United States and of the President’s position, it will be next to impossible to leave the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the “leaders” at the conference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, there will be no “leaders’ conference”. (5) The United States has absolutely no objections to making these talks a Japanese-U.S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do is to arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, so that they will not get the impression that the United States is trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of your instructions to Hull. [A-96] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR (6) I have been doing everything in my power, however insignificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, however, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points alone for the time being and watch developments. [a] #561 (See III, 175). #562 (See III, 176). #563 (See III, 177). Trans. 9-18-41 No. 181 September 17, 1941 #823. FROM: Washington (Nomura) TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) (Parts 1 and 2 of 3) (1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed my opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three other points that had to be clarified and “brought up to date”. When he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June. Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message #397 of 24 July,[a] since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The break-down continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent. (2) The “understanding” which was put into words and submitted as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen conferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerably attached to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months. It is my opinion that the U.S. will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in that proposal were followed. Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here. [a] See III, 9—You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long.   http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us  It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U.S. Should the U.S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (Such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U.S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation. Trans. 9-19-41 [A-97] No. 182 September 17, 1941 #823. FROM: Washington (Nomura) TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) (Part 3 of 3) In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points— particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops. According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U.S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made. Nishiyama (Financial Attache) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President “went too far” during the talks with this Ambassador. Trans. 9-19-41  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

objective in this direction 9.obj.77377 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 2, 2009

No.  730

FROM: Berlin                                                                                      July 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 830.

Translator’s note: Following message badly garbled; gist guessed at.

(Abstract)

I have recently become ill and find that I am unable to fulfill my duties. For this reason, will you please order me home at once.

Trans.  7‑12‑41

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No.  731

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)                                                                   July 4, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 607.

From the Vice‑Minister.

The Foreign Minister was at variance with the general trend of the Foreign Office, and you see what happened as a result. Please keep this in mind.

Trans.  7‑22‑41

No.  732

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 5, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 613.

Regarding your # 830 [a].

Please give reconsideration regarding the matter of your desire to return home.

While I sympathize with your physical condition the effect of your deserting your post at a time like this will be extremely unfavorable and considered quite inopportune.

It goes without saying that none of us is free to do as he pleases in this world and our duty to our country demands that we put aside our personal desires and unite in a single effort for the good of our country.

I feel confident that the situations facing our country are fairly well understood through the “oral statement” submitted by me to Ambassador Ott (Germany), Inmari (?) (Italy) and Smetanin (Russia). I am also quite certain that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop will have no difficulty in understanding our position.

The declaration of our countries concrete policy involves more than a declaration of an opinion, it involves various problems affecting military preparations, etc., and certainly a brilliant person such as Hitler can appreciate this without difficulty. It also should be clear that the resumption of our relations with the Soviet is not due to any fondness on our part for the U.S.S.R. In considering the various problems involved, we are forced by circumstances beyond our control to maintain the present attitude, and I would appreciate your giving greater consideration to this point.

Regarding your resignation, this requires the approval of the Emperor, and I am reluctant, in view of the times, to approach His Majesty regarding it. I, therefore, beseech you to remain at your post and cooperate with me in seeing our country through these troubled times.


[a] See II, 730. The Jap Amb. at Berlin wires Tokyo he is ill and unable to fulfill his duties. Requests that he be ordered home at once.

Trans.  7‑22‑41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No.  733

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 12, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 637.

http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US

(Part 1 of 3) [a].

On the evening of the 8th, your personal message was transmitted to me through Ambassador OTT. That evening I asked the Ambassador to transmit to you my humble opinion concerning the views you expressed to me with so much confidence in me, and also my thanks for your having done so. The Ambassador thought the Oral Statement that was given him that afternoon regarding the important decision Japan had made on that day and the few remarks I had made in reference to the decision constituted my reply to your message. Consequently, nothing more was done about it. Furthermore, since then there has not been any request made by the Ambassador for a reply. Besides, reply from me. I have thought over your I did not think that you were anticipating a separate message since then, and since last night when I had to go to bed with a fever, I again thought over your message, and although I felt that I had already replied to it, I also began to feel that as a close friend of yours I must convey my humble opinions to you again, and so, prompted by the feeling that we are intimate friends, I am writing this message to you briefly and solely for you.


[a] See II, 734, 735.

Trans.  7‑19‑41

No.  734

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 12, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 637.

(Part 2 of 3) [a].

(1) I trust that you have been able to understand through the oral statement which I handed to Ambassador OTT, as well as through the few remarks I had added, the trend of our country which you were desirous of knowing.

(2) As you know, Japan is not Germany; that is to say, she is not a country in which a dictator decides the national policy. Furthermore, there are, unfortunately, many people who, because of past foreign intercourse and of international tradition, are still incorrigible worshippers of Great Britain and the United States. Since there is among the subjects a considerable divergence of opinions, unlike Germany, these various opinions are being put into practice with good intentions. In other words, a condition exists in this country such as we find in all non‑belligerent countries at present and which had prevailed in Germany before the appearance of HITLER. Therefore, I cannot help but ask you to consider sympathetically the fact that we must at all times exercise patience and resort to soft pedaling methods and untiringly work toward our original objective, at times making an effort to be even more cautious.

(3) I wish to thank you very much for the information and forecast relative to the war between Germany and Soviet Russia which you gave me in your message. I am at all times paying close attention to developments taking place in this war. These developments are important in view not only of our common objective, but also of the tremendous effect it will have upon the future of this country. I feel extremely happy over the brilliant victories which Ger‑

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many has been winning up to today. However, I have some (disagreement?) with regard to your opinions concerning the future.


[a] Part 1 of 3 see II, 733.

Trans. 7‑21‑41

http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US

No.  735

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 12, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 637.

(Part 3 of 3).

(4) I was quite elated to find in the message which you sent me that in most points regarding the future you concur with me. As to the question of disposing of Soviet Russia, I agree with you entirely, as you will judge from the answers I made when I conferred with you concerning that country.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

(5) However, as you have noted during our conversations, we differ somewhat in our views regarding the possibility of the United States entering the war. I am praying day and night that things will turn out as you are hoping they will. If only we could take a common measure in order to keep the United States out of this war until the Russian question is settled, it would be fine, for, we agree in what should be done thereafter. It goes without saying that Japan is constantly endeavoring to realize her objective in this direction. However, regarding this question—it may be because I know little about the United States—I, as a Foreign Minister of an allied country as well as an intimate friend of yours, cannot help but be greatly concerned. I would greatly appreciate your informing HITLER of this fact which I have repeatedly pointed out. What I am endeavoring to do is to prepare spiritually and materially for coping also with a situation that might be disadvantageous to us.

(6) In regard to the concluding words in your message, I need not point out by means of examples that I am entirely in accord with your views. (July 12, 1941).

Trans.  7‑21‑41

No.  736

FROM: Ankara                                                                                    July 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 150.

On the 26th VON PAPEN, referring to the suppressive measures taken by the United States against Japan, said: “America beyond any doubt never has desired, nor does she now desire, war with Japan. The American Isolationists are tending to become stronger. Therefore, if you Japanese are content with consolidating your gains in French Indo‑China and turn rather upon the Soviet, I do not think that the United States will fight. On the other hand, Germany, too, is taking a very cautious attitude until she has defeated Russia. She is doing her best to forestall a conflict between the American and German naval and air forces in the Atlantic and, at the same time, to defeat Russia and prepare for an attack upon the British Isles. This, however, seems to me an impossible task.”

Relayed to Berlin. Relay to Hsinking.

Trans.  7‑29‑41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No.  737

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 1505.

(Circular)

Action Moscow as # 737.

On the 12th, Soviet Ambassador Smetanin called on this Minister and stated that he has been advised by the Ambassadors of Britain and the United States that I had said that the Japanese‑Soviet Neutrality Pact is an impotent instrument from the legal standpoint, and that Japan was not obliged to adhere to its terms. The Soviet Ambassador wished to be told as to the truth of these alleged statements.

I, therefore, replied that:

1. The Pact was, of course, effective. However, in view of the circumstances at the time of its signing, it was not applicable to the present war. Japan intends to strictly adhere to the aims and spirit of the Tripartite Pact, which, in fact, is the foundation of Japan’s entire foreign policy. The neutrality agreement is effective only in so far as the Soviet’s relations with all countries excepting those countries which are our allies (sic).

2. To date, neither Germany nor Italy has invoked the Tripartite Pact to demand our entrance into the war. Moreover, this Minister does not anticipate that either will make such a demand in the future.

3. I am firmly convinced that in so far as this particular war is concerned, Japan need not be subjected to the terms of either the Tripartite Pact or the Neutrality Pact and that she is in a position to decide upon a policy entirely independent of both.

Speaking in a strictly legal sense, the terms of the Tripartite Pact could be interpreted to mean that Japan is obligated to enter this war. However, Germany, which has the law on her side, has not demanded that we enter this war. I advised that the Soviet Union act with care and urged the Ambassador to make an effort to facilitate the carrying out of Japan’s policy which I outlined to the Ambassador on 2 July.

According to press reports, I said, the turning over of Kamchatka to the United States by the Soviet Union is being considered. Other newspapers report that Great Britain is dispatching military officers and other personnel to Siberia.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that such reports excite Japanese public opinion to a great degree. Even if these reports are denied, the feeling of doubt would no doubt sharply rise.

Please be advised that paragraphs 1 to 3 were subsequently put in writing and handed to the Ambassador. When the opportunity arises, will you, too reiterate to the Soviet authorities the various points outlined above.

Relayed to NZB and Washington.

Trans.  7‑16‑41

No.  738

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 1506.

(Circular)

Subsequent to the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, I explained and clarified Japan’s stand with regard to Japanese‑Soviet relations, to the Soviet Ambassador

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on 24 June and again on 2 July. On these occasions, the Ambassador gave every indication that he was satisfied. The fact that he again called on me for further information (see my message to Moscow # 747 [a]) indicates that the British and United States Ambassadors in Tokyo are stirring him up.

The above is for your information.


[a] See II, (Message no. not given in text. LWJ)

Trans. 7‑16‑41

No.  739

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)                                                                June 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)                                                                    # 742.

Reporting conditions here since the beginning of hostilities:

1. Since immediately following Molotov’s radio broadcast, long lines of people have been seen waiting to purchase food supplies and kerosene.

2. In the city at every open space, crowds are seen listening to instructions broadcast regarding air‑defense (also in meetings in all factories), but not much enthusiasm is shown.

3. When night falls, there is seen some movement of ‑‑‑– directed toward the anti‑aircraft gun positions.

4. Very strict control is exercised over ‑‑‑‑- of all dwellings and dormitories.

5. As for telegrams from Finland, # 117 [a] from the Minister there to the Foreign Minister, and # 128 [a] were received this morning and afternoon, respectively.


[a] Not available

Trans.  6‑27‑41

http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US

No.  740

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)                                                                June 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)                                                                    # 743.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

1. The German Embassy here was ordered to vacate the local legation of former Poland and the legation residence of the former Austria, in which the Germans had been housing some of its staff members. It seems they will be able to take care of all the staff members in dwellings belonging to the Embassy, but all contact and telephone connections with the outside are cut off.

2. The Italian Embassy has had no communication from the home government, and, therefore, it is not known when they will be leaving for Italy.

3. ‑‑‑‑- Lieut. General Yamashita ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑– safely from ‑‑‑‑- (too garbled for completion).

Trans.  6‑27‑41

A-380

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No.  741

FROM: Moscow                                                                                  June 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Tatekawa)                                                                        # 747.

1. An air‑defense maneuver was held here for about 30 minutes from 3:00 A.M. on the 24th, during which .period airplanes flew over the city and shells were shot from anti‑aircraft guns. Although this time the maneuver came immediately following the opening of the Russo‑German War and no advance notice was given of it, on the whole, considerable efficiency was shown in mobilizing both the protection units and security units, and the citizens appeared to maintain an attitude of calm.

2. I have noted a marked decrease in the number of taxi cabs in the city, and one now sees hardly a cab in use. Lines of people waiting to purchase food and other daily necessities have grown fewer. There is abundance of food, but the market price is tending upward.

Trans.  6‑27‑41

No.  742

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     June 30, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       No number.

Extra

Re your message of the 28th.

1. We are confident that they will perform their duties with all zeal and assist the Red Army and Navy which will win the final victory.

2. Every enemy in the past, notably Napoleon, that has invaded Russia has met disaster. That in itself is a good omen that the ultimate victory will be to Russia.

3. Reports on the war are scarce, but on the western border the Red Army’s counter‑offensive appears to have been successful. It appears that on the 22nd and 23rd, 50,000 prisoners were taken and 300 tanks blown up. Scarcely any reference is made to their own losses. However, it is reported that up to the 24th, 381 German planes were downed and that the Red Army lost 374.

I have sent this message to Hsinking.

Trans.  7‑3‑41

No.  743

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 16, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 404.

Received from Moscow as # 928, 15 July.

Second report on the developments of the Russo-German war.

1. The German army in the north is continuing its fierce attack to the south of Leningrad in order to facilitate the advance of the main German forces in the center. Apparently, it is the German strategy to use this northern force to compel the northwestern forces of the Soviet Union to abandon Leningrad. However, since about a week ago, or after the capture of Ostrov, this German army has not shown much activity.

A-381

This seems to indicate that the German force in that area is not large, or that it is purposely avoiding the entrance into the area between Leningrad and Moscow. The scenes of the crucial battles are now shifting to Polotsk and Vitebsk, to the north of the highway connecting Minsk and Moscow.

Between the Soviet military bases in this area and Moscow there are no natural or artificial barriers to speak of. If the Germans succeed in capturing these Soviet military strongholds, then they will be able to pour into Moscow from several directions. These battles may be said to be the key to the whole war and, therefore, the Soviet Union is making all out efforts to hold this area.

Basically speaking, the outstanding feature of the Soviet defense strip is its extreme depth, which, according to common knowledge, reaches 40 kilometers if division bases, army air corps bases and other bases are included in it. It is possible, therefore, that the German forces which by fierce attacks succeeded in breaking through the first and second lines of defense, are being held by the subsequent Soviet defense bases. Unless the Germans succeed in breaking through these last defense bases within this week or so, it is believed that considerable time will be required by them to reassemble their attacking forces.

In the South‑Central front, the fall of Kiev is expected within the next few days. However, the German forces will be confronted with the big problem of crossing the Dnieper River which is a big obstacle to hurdle. They will not doubt require considerable time to make preparations for the crossing unless the Soviet forces make some unexpected and inexcusable errors.

2. Apparently the Soviet forces are gradually overcoming their original confusion. They have managed to rush troops from the Ural and west Siberia to the front lines to bolster the forces regularly stationed in European Russia. Through such means, they were able to form a defense organization of sorts in the nick of time.

However, about one third of the cream of the Soviet air and mechanized forces was lost in the very first battles. Already, there are indications that they are fighting with their backs against the wall. It is, therefore, firmly believed that the complete defeat of the Soviet forces is only a matter of time.

3. The government of the Soviet Union has clamped down a strict censorship on news to the general public, of Soviet military defeats. The news which is released is not accurate; rather, it is a reflection of wishful thinking. It is regularly reported that “the German advances are being turned back over the entire line.” The general public in Moscow are still ignorant of the fact that Minsk fell into German hands shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. At the same time, since Germany has not bombed Moscow as yet, the people are considerably less excited now than they were at the outset of the hostilities.

You can well imagine the surprise and the subsequent confusion of these uninformed people when, all of a sudden, they hear German gunfire and are showered with German bombs.

(From here to end garbled, guess work contained).

The general public has been advised that if the war continues, it will have to be put on a ration system. However, there are indications that there is an extreme shortage of food and daily necessities already and it is to be doubted whether this shortage could now be overcome even if an extreme ration card system were put into effect tomorrow. Since the outbreak of this war such articles as fish have disappeared from the market counters.

Please relay this message to Manchukuo.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans.  7‑21‑41

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